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This thesis analyzes contemporary civil–military relations in three Latin 
American countries: Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay. Since 2010, each country has 
elected a president who was previously an armed insurgent resisting authoritarian 
regimes of the 1970s and 1980s. Considering this phenomenon and evaluating recent 
trends across Latin America to expand military roles and missions, civil–military 
relations are assessed using a new framework. The framework, adapted from the “trinity” 
model employed by scholars at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Civil–
Military Relations, shows significant differences among the three cases and their 
respective degrees of positive civil–military relations; however, the specific phenomenon 
of electing a former insurgent to the presidency has not resulted in a significant 
deterioration of the relationship between the armed forces and their civilian executives. In 
fact, civil–military relations under ex-insurgent presidents have been improved over the 
last decade in each country. Ultimately, this thesis concludes that Uruguay has achieved 
the greatest degree of positive civil–military relations, and trends are presented for 
consideration in improving civil–military relations across the region. 
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Since 2010, Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay have each elected presidents who, 
earlier in their lives, were active and armed insurgents. All three elected leaders were 
members of Marxist–Leninist insurgencies fiercely contested by their governments—
hunted down and smoked out by use of military repression and various forms of torture 
and violence. 
Authoritarianism swept across nearly all of Latin America in the 1970s and 
1980s. In Brazil, a 21-year military regime left power in 1985, following a period of 
transition during which the military was still highly influential in state affairs. Hundreds 
of Brazilians were tortured and killed under military rule. Uruguay transitioned from a 
12-year civilian-military authoritarian period in 1984. Hundreds of Uruguayans were 
tortured and killed during the authoritarian era. Neither of the South American countries 
experienced the levels of violence of nearby Argentina or Chile, but the repression 
resulted in thousands of people imprisoned, living in fear, or exiled from their 
homelands.1  
El Salvador’s military dictatorship dissolved into a 12-year civil war that began in 
1979 and ended in 1992. In contrast to the other two cases studied in this thesis, over 
70,000 Salvadorans were killed in its civil war with thousands more displaced—a civil 
war comparable to that of neighboring Guatemala. A map of Latin America is shown in 





                                                 
1 An official truth commission in Brazil accounts for 191 killed and 243 “disappeared,” while 
hundreds more were imprisoned. Uruguay’s statistics are not as well documented. Many Uruguayans 
suffered abuses in neighboring Argentina; estimates are between 3,000 and 4,000 imprisoned and several 
hundred killed or “disappeared.” Chapters II, III, and IV provide a brief account of each country’s military 
history during the authoritarian era up to the present. 
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Figure 1.  Map of Latin America  
 
Brazil (green), El Salvador (red), and Uruguay (blue) highlighted. Adapted from: “Latin 
America Outline Map,” accessed October 12, 2015, http://www.worldatlas.com/
webimage/countrys/namerica/latinout.htm?ref=binfind.com/web. 
Today, nearly all nations in Latin America are democratic; however, the means by 
which democracy was restored and the process of political reconciliation differ 
significantly from country to country. While so much of the region shares a similar 
embattled experience of insurgency and state repression during the global Cold War, the 
democracies of contemporary Latin America vary significantly. Modern Brazil, El 
Salvador, and Uruguay differ greatly in population, geography, economic development, 
and security challenges. A glance at basic World Bank and United Nations statistics 
underscores how dissimilar these nations are (see Table 1). Brazil, the largest country in 
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Latin America, has been able to lift many of its people out of poverty in the last two 
decades but still struggles with high levels of crime. El Salvador, with the lowest Gross 
Domestic Product and income level, has seen crime increase dramatically over the last 
several years. While the statistic of 41 homicides per 100,000 people is high, a more 
recent and unofficial tally shows the homicide rate to be about 90 per 100,000.2 Uruguay, 
the smallest country of the three by population, has the highest level of development and 
lowest level of crime. 
Table 1.   Key Country Statistics 
While official estimates are not yet available for 2015, El Salvador’s homicide rate is 
estimated to have increased to about 90 per 100K. Adapted from The World Bank, “2014 
Database,” http://data.worldbank.org/; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “2013 
Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics,” http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/statistics/crime.html. 
Societal tensions from past eras of military repression and human rights abuse 
have mostly abated, but some important issues of civil–military relations are still 
unresolved. Additionally, over the last two decades, each country has expanded its 
military’s roles and missions, especially in combatting internal crime and narco-
trafficking as well as contributing to international peacekeeping operations. This thesis 
explores the dual-phenomenon of democratically elected ex-insurgent presidents and the 
expansion of military roles and missions. This comparative analysis of Brazil, El 
                                                 
2 Jonathan Watts, “One Murder Every Hour: How El Salvador Became the Homicide Capital of the 














Brazil 202 $2,346  Upper Middle Income 25 
El Salvador 6.4 $25  Lower Middle Income 41 
Uruguay 3.4 $58  High Income 8 
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Salvador, and Uruguay studies this dual-phenomenon to assess contemporary civil–
military relations in each. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE 
In the United States and other NATO countries, a key component of civil–military 
relations is taken for granted—that of civilian control of the armed forces. As Thomas 
Bruneau points out in his 2015 article in Small Wars and Insurgencies, a misconception 
of civil–military relations in new democracies—where “civilian control is 
problematic”—leads to strategically “short-sighted” U.S. interaction with these 
developing countries.3 For the United States to have significant and mutually beneficial 
security assistance with the three countries studied in this thesis—or any other—there 
should be a deeper understanding of a foreign military’s power relative to its civil society 
and other state institutions, especially those designed to provide civilian control of the 
armed forces. 
The significance of this thesis is threefold. First, the three countries analyzed are 
distinct geographically, economically, demographically, and historically providing a 
small yet diverse representation of Latin American states and their paths toward positive 
civil–military relations.4 It may be useful to apply lessons learned from Brazil, El 
Salvador, and Uruguay to other Latin American nations. 
Second, Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay are three countries that recently elected 
presidents with insurgent pasts, a phenomenon that could be expected to cause civil–
military relations to deteriorate. Scarred by troubled pasts with the military, have 
presidents struck back at their former adversaries? If so, how? 
Third, in analyzing the three countries and the civil–military relations under ex-
insurgent presidents, lessons could be applied in future electoral victories by ex-insurgent 
                                                 
3 Thomas Bruneau, “Challenges in building partner capacity: Civil-military relations in the United 
States and new democracies,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 26, no. 3 (2015), 429–445. 
4 The term “positive civil–military relations” can take many interpretations; its use in this thesis is 
defined as “a set of institutions interacting in a single political structure, whereby civilian politicians 
actively assign, monitor, and control military roles and missions and the military effectively carries them 
out.” The varying definitions of civil–military relations are reviewed in the literature review of Section B, 
with an elaboration on this paper’s definition in Section C of this chapter. 
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politicians. It is possible—even likely—that other countries in the region will elect ex-
insurgents to political office. While not studied in this thesis, Colombia elected a 
reconciled guerrilla fighter in 2014 to the office of mayor of its capital city, Bogotá, 
despite the fact that the main insurgent groups are still in conflict with the government. 
With so many citizens affected by military dictatorships in the not-so-distant past, and so 
many Latin Americans in some way resisting past military regimes, having a “story to 
tell” is still a message that resonates with many voters. The ongoing insurgencies in 
Colombia and Peru could result in a “new generation” of ex-insurgents brought into the 
mainstream political process. Lessons learned in the study of civil–military relations from 
Brazilian, Salvadoran, and Uruguayan ex-insurgents in political office could be applied to 
future cases. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Civil–military relations in Latin America, in conjunction with recent transitions to 
democracy, are part of an evolving experience, differing in both methodology and 
maturity between countries. Much has been written on the subject by writers largely 
influenced by the two forefathers of American civil–military relations: Samuel 
Huntington and Morris Janowitz. Consensus among authors on how to improve Latin 
America’s civil–military relations is certainly not established, as there are multiple 
prescriptions on how to best improve relations or even how to properly measure success.  
This section reviews the literature in three parts, presented chronologically by the 
preeminent theme in each era. Part 1 reviews the traditional arguments of professionalism 
as described during the Cold War, with a review of its applicability and level of success 
in Latin America. Part 2 reviews methods to institutionalize civilian control, particularly 
salient in the region during transitions from authoritarian military regimes to democratic 
civilian governments. Part 3, with the most contemporary literature on the subject, 
reviews the need for mature democracies in Latin America to redefine and reform the 
varying missions performed by their militaries. 
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1. Professionalism 
Samuel Huntington asserted in 1957 that “professionalism distinguishes the 
military officer of today from the warriors of previous ages.”5 His work on civil–military 
relations describes a relationship between a professional officer corps and its civilian 
government as one of “objective civilian control,” which is enacted by “professionalizing 
the military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral.”6 Huntington’s model 
called for high levels of military autonomy and segregation from the political sphere so as 
to be apolitical and impartial, focusing instead on the expertise in “the management of 
violence.”7 While an effective lens when peering into the relations of the United States 
military in its interactions with civilian politicians, scholars have pointed to several issues 
when applying Huntington’s model of civil–military relations to many of the United 
States’ southern hemispheric neighbors. The following paragraphs examine the 
challenges that Huntington’s and Janowitz’s professionalism theories face when applied 
to Latin America. 
Latin America has a unique legacy of religious colonialism, effects of which can 
be traced to many institutions including its militaries. Colonial Latin America 
experienced a “fusion of administrative, judicial, and military authority,” which inserted 
the military officer into such non-military affairs as taxes, tariffs, and politics.8 After the 
winning of independence, national armies took on the role of guardians of la patria and 
even when constitutions were written to outline the responsibilities of various parts of 
government the armed forces became “virtually a fourth branch of government.”9 This is 
a sharp distinction between the North and South American colonial legacies. Latin 
American nations used “corporatist traditions to define civil–military relations [that] 
                                                 
5 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 7.  
6 Ibid., 84. 
7 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 15. 
8 Brian Loveman, “Historical Foundations of Civil–Military Relations in Spanish America,” in Civil–
Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, ed. David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 250–53.  
9 Ibid., 260–62. 
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emphasize military autonomy in spheres of military competence (effectively eliminating 
civilian authority in military affairs).”10  
While Huntington’s call for military autonomy was for the removal from politics, 
the Latin American legacy presents the danger of placing the military above politics. 
Brazil is a well-documented study of the risk of a military that perceives itself to be 
above politics. The Brazilian military, in coordination with American military advisors, 
expanded studies at its Escola Superior de Guerra to articulate a curriculum of studies 
that would prepare officers and civilians to defeat both external and internal threats to 
national security; courses included, among others, political, economic, and military 
affairs.11 “The new professionalism contributed to an all-embracing attitude of military 
managerialism in regard to Brazil’s political system.”12 Professionalism, as Huntington 
described it, faces a legacy to overcome in Latin America, and has even been deemed a 
justification for military takeover of civilian government. 
A second traditional type of professionalism was described by Morris Janowitz in 
1960. Rather than creating an autonomous and apolitical military, Janowitz called for the 
socialization of the military with the political and civic spheres. This integration was 
crucial to constructing a “constabulary force” that, through its blending with civil society, 
develops shared common values, thereby professionalizing the military and alleviating 
tensions in civil–military relations.13 The notion that a socialization of Latin American 
militaries with other professional groups will improve civil–military relations has been 
questioned. For instance, recent history in Latin America saw the military step beyond a 
socialization with politics to an overthrow of them—certainly not the intended 
consequence of Janowitz’s professionalization. Even after return to democracy, the 
military remained a large force in the running of the state, whereby “handing over the 
                                                 
10 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Epilogue: The Liberal Tradition,” in Civil–Military Relations and Democracy, 
eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 155. 
11 Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,” in 
Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1973), 52–54.  
12 Ibid., 55. 
13 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1971), 435–40.  
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presidency to a civilian did not in fact mean the military was returning to the barracks.”14 
A lingering vision persists in Latin America of the guardian role of the military both in 
military ranks and in society at large.15 Deep-rooted tensions exist that cannot necessarily 
be overcome with increased socialization, especially when the prevalent norm may not be 
one of democratic civil–military relations as understood in the United States.  
It has also been argued that increased socialization with Western militaries could 
prove beneficial to professionalization, especially through deployment abroad supporting 
peacekeeping operations. The experiences of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, however, 
have had mixed impacts on their respective civil–military relations. The type of mission 
conducted and the organizations with which the peacekeepers interacted determine 
whether the military socialization improved civil–military relations.16 For instance, 
according to Arturo Sotomayor, Argentina had positive impact from socialization in UN 
peacekeeping missions, largely due to socialization with more advanced (and often 
NATO) militaries from mature democracies. Brazil and Uruguay, on the other hand, 
socialized with militaries of other developing and transitional governments, thereby 
reinforcing internally oriented mission sets and lacking the benefits of “projecting proper, 
liberal, and democratic norms” to its participating military members.17 Hence, 
socialization as a means of professionalizing the military and improving civil–military 
relations has its limits and must be conducted both domestically and internationally with 
a well-implemented strategy. 
2. Institutionalizing Civilian Control 
Another method of improving civil–military relations is to solidify the institutions 
that guarantee civilian control of the armed forces. As Latin American nations 
transitioned to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, constitutions were rewritten and 
                                                 
14 J. Samuel Fitch, “Military Attitudes toward Democracy in Latin America: How Do We Know If 
Anything Has Changed?,” in Civil–Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, ed. 
David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 59. 
15 Ibid., 67–78. 
16 Arturo C. Sotomayor, The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper: Civil–Military Relations and the 
United Nations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2014), 100. 
17 Ibid., 126. 
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democratic institutions were reestablished. Codifying in institutions the democratic norms 
and principles of positive civil–military relations is the ideal approach. Narcís Serra was 
instrumental in achieving this transition as Minister of Defense in post–Franco Spain 
from 1982 to 1991, but on a different continent with a different regional security 
environment. He claims that Spain successfully reformed its civil–military relations due 
to the civilian government “demonstrating that it could direct both defense and military 
policies, asserting political and organizational control over the military, progressively 
demanding that the armed forces be more effective, and laying the foundation for 
overcoming the conflicts that come with transition and achieving democratic status.”18 
This level of reform is at best a long-term goal in most Latin American countries, and at 
worst naïve wishful thinking due to the relative weakness of state institutions and the lack 
of a powerful and wealthy community of NATO allies to incentivize such a costly task.  
Instead, David Pion-Berlin identifies the default model of civil–military relations 
in Latin America: “Political civilian control is a low-cost means of achieving a relative 
calm in civil–military affairs without investing in extensive institution building, expertise, 
legislative oversight, and large budgets.”19 This type of civilian control requires personal 
connections between political and military leaders, whereby “presidents promote officers 
with whom they are familiar, have known via political party or familial connections, or 
who they surmise will be loyal to them.”20 This form of civil–military relations calls for 
civilian leaders to be expert liaisons and negotiators, vice experts in defense policy and 
strategy. 
In his critical response to Pion-Berlin’s “Political Management of the Military in 
Latin America,” Thomas Bruneau points to the expanding roles and missions assigned to 
militaries in the region: confronting internal conflict, engaging in peacekeeping missions 
                                                 
18 Narcis Serra and Marton Harsanyi, “The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Spanish 
Armed Forces,” in Military Engagement: Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic 
Transition, ed. Dennis Blair (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 323. 
19 David Pion-Berlin, “Political Management of the Military in Latin America,” Military Review 85 
(January-February 2005): 28. 
20 Ibid. 
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abroad, and taking part in U.S.-led counter-terrorism across the hemisphere.21 He states 
that  
civilian policy makers not only manage the armed forces, but also decide 
on their roles and missions, whether those civilians want to or not and 
whether or not they are well informed…it is more important that they 
establish stable institutions that embody and perpetuate the expertise 
needed to deal with possible roles and missions as they arise. Only in this 
way can democratic governments deal with problems and crises in a 
routine and internationally acceptable manner.22 
In contrast to strengthening the democratic institutions that guarantee civilian 
control, an alternative prescription discussed by Kirk Bowman involves a shifting of 
power by means of downsizing and demilitarizing the armed forces. This argument 
claims that only demilitarization can reverse the trend of the region’s armed forces acting 
as a “substantial and significant negative effect on democracy, economic growth, and 
equity in Latin America.”23 The argument looks at Costa Rica and Honduras, 
underscoring how divergent policy in civil–military relations has been a leading factor to 
the development of the former and the economic and political stagnation of the latter.24 
While a look at each country’s GDP may at first seem to strengthen this argument,25 the 
1948 abolition of Costa Rica’s military is but one of many causal factors to describe 
Costa Rica’s more developed status—others include Costa Rica’s early 20th Century land 
reform and decades of political and economic liberalization.  
Brazil in the 1990s, on the other hand, has been cited as a case whereby civilian 
control of the armed forces was insured via its weak democratic institutions that based 
electoral success on “patronage and endorsement of popularity-enhancing platforms, 
                                                 
21 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Civil–Military Relations in Latin America: The Hedgehog and the Fox 
Revisited,” Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad 19, no. 1(2005): 113–18. 
22 Ibid., 121. 
23 Kirk S. Bowman, Militarization, Democracy, and Development: The Perils of Praetorianism in 
Latin America (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 4. 
24 Ibid., 4. 
25 Costa Rica’s 2014 GDP was $49.55B compared to Honduras’ GDP of $19.39B, according to the 
World Bank.  
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practices that are likely to be at odds with military preferences.”26 Brazilian politicians, 
motivated by rational-choice decision making, have been successful in reducing “the 
political and economic space the military occupy” by cutting the size and spending on the 
military in favor of other voter-preferred programs.27 
One additional example of the weakening of the military as an institution is 
Argentina. Drawing a comparison between post-authoritarian neighbors, Argentina and 
Chile, Zoltan Barany describes that  
in Chile democratizers have succeeded in gradually reducing the military’s 
political autonomy to a level acceptable by democratic standards. Their 
Argentine colleagues, on the other hand, have gone too far in what has 
amounted to a virtual vendetta against the military as an institution and, in 
the process, seriously impaired its ability to protect and project Argentine 
national interests.28 
There is no consensus on which method is preferred: the strengthening of 
democratic institutions or the weakening of the military’s influence in state affairs. There 
is consensus, however, that civil–military relations in Latin America following the return 
to democracy must insure civilian control of the armed forces. Other components of 
positive civil–military relations are the military’s effective exercise of its assigned roles 
and missions. 
3. Redefining and Reforming Military Missions 
The civil–military relations priority during Latin American transitions to 
democracy was creating a guarantee that militaries would become subject to new civilian 
governments. In most Latin American nations, democracy has been established as “the 
only game in town”; that is, by most accounts, most Latin American governments are 
now “consolidated democracies.”29 This third section builds on the previous two but will 
                                                 
26 Wendy Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 24. 
27 Ibid., 142. 
28 Zoltan Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, 
Europe, and the Americas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 143. 
29 J. J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Toward Consolidated Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 2 
(1996); 14–33. 
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entail the focus of the research conducted in this thesis as it addresses the most 
contemporary and ongoing debates in Latin American civil–military-relations. 
A key first distinction between missions as they relate to civil–military relations is 
between those externally versus internally focused. This distinction has been cited as a 
structurally problematic source of tension by Michael Desch. The “internal orientation” 
of Latin American militaries may serve as an inherent threat to civilian control and 
democracy because their internally focused roles and missions “linked military 
institutional interests to the level of internal economic development and the course of 
domestic politics.”30 According to Desch, with few external threats to the state, Latin 
America often finds itself in the “worst” category of civil–military relations due to 
militaries facing high domestic threats with low external ones.31 While this environment 
may not change significantly in Latin America—especially with limited possible 
scenarios of inter-state armed conflict32—not all scholars agree in an inward-oriented 
military equating to ill-fated civil–military relations.  
Operations that the armed forces across Latin America are called to carry out can be 
categorized as national defense, internal security, development, or international security.33 
Contrary to the common hypothesis that internally focused and expansive (i.e., prone to 
“mission creep”) operations would yield worse civilian control, data spanning across South 
America shows cases of poor civilian control in restrictive and external operations as well 
as high civilian control in expansive and internal operations.34 This puts to rest some of the 
concerns presented by Desch regarding civilian control of the military. There exist, 
however, other negative effects of a military with internally focused operations: 
                                                 
30 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 101. 
31 Ibid., 115–120. 
32 Arie M. Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in 
Comparative Perspective (New York: State University of New York, 1998); Felix E. Martin, Militarist 
Peace in South America: Conditions for War and Peace (New York: Palgrave, 2006). 
33 David Pion-Berlin and Craig Arceneaux, “Decision Makers or Decision Takers? Military Missions 
and Civilian Control in Democratic South America,” Armed Forces and Societies 26, no. 3 (Spring 2000): 
422–24. 
34 Ibid., 429–432. 
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when militaries enmesh themselves in activities such as infrastructure 
building, medical extension services, or environmental protection, they are 
filling roles normally reserved for civilians. If such activities impede the 
growth of civilian organizations, then they harm the chances for balanced, 
long-term development by weakening civil society.35  
Due to weak state capacity to confront such challenges as humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief as well as growing domestic security concerns, Latin American 
democracies have little choice but to employ their militaries domestically; however, in 
these circumstances, methods can be and have been employed to sustain civilian control. 
The militaries in Ecuador and Peru have been described as elevating missions 
above the priority of the state and its citizenry in order to seek material benefits; the 
power of oil and natural gas companies as well as U.S. Southern Command influences in 
the region have enticed officers to “allocate troops not according to technical decisions 
regarding national security interests but rather according to who can and will reimburse 
the army for its services.”36 Poor mission performance was displayed by the Peruvian 
army when tasked with conducting counter-insurgency operations against the Shining 
Path; the army often shied away from conflict and sheepishly patrolled the known 
sources of the insurgent group despite civilian leadership’s call for action.37 State-
assigned mission performance, therefore, should be a key indicator for positive civil–
military relations in Latin America. 
A framework for assessing civil–military relations by some scholars at the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Center for Civil Military Relations (CCMR) is a “trinity” of 
conditions: democratic control, effectiveness, and efficiency.38 Democratic control 
includes civilian control but then builds on it to include congressional oversight and 
institutional capacity via a ministry of defense or equivalent; effectiveness is the 
                                                 
35 Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, “Decision Makers or Decision Takers?., 433. 
36 Maiah Jaskoski, “Army for Rent, Terms Negotiable,” Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies 
(Spring 2009), 49. 
37 Maiah Jaskoski, “Civilian Control of the Armed Forces in Democratic Latin America: Military 
Prerogatives, Contestation, and Mission Performance in Peru,” Armed Forces and Society 38, no. 1(2012). 
38 Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, eds., Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic 
Civil–Military Relations (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2006); Thomas C. Bruneau and Richard 
B. Goetze, “Civil–Military Relations in Latin America,” Military Review (September-October 2006).  
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military’s carrying out of civilian-assigned roles and missions; efficiency is the ability to 
carry out the roles and missions without excessive monetary waste to the government.39 
The need for clear guidance from democratically elected civilians and the costs of not 
having such guidance result in a “lack of clarity over what roles and missions should be, 
and how to implement changes”; governments will otherwise “have no clear idea of what 
defense ‘product’ they are paying for.”40  
An issue in Latin America, however, is an “Attention Deficit” whereby civilian 
politicians pay little attention to defense issues because of the relatively peaceful region 
and the “low importance that voters assign to the provisions of the national defense as 
either a public or private good.”41 Ultimately, if Latin American states aspire to be 
consolidated democracies then elected officials cannot sidestep their responsibilities in 
properly assigning the armed forces roles and missions that further national interests. 
Civil–military relations in consolidated democracies of Latin America should reach a 
point where  
further issues of civil–military relations will be similar to those in other 
democracies throughout the world. They become ‘management’ problems 
revolving around the balance of power and force and the inherent tension 
between democracy and expertise…it is how governments deal with these 
issues that constitutes the crux of civil–military relations and will 
determine not only how successful civilians are in controlling armed 
forces but also how effective these forces will be in fulfilling the 
increasingly varied roles and missions that are assigned to them.42 
Civil–military relations have matured at different rates across Latin America, 
much like the region’s young democratic institutions. While the region has few examples 
                                                 
39 Bruneau and Goetze, “Civil–Military Relations in Latin America,” 70–71. 
40 Thomas C. Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, “International Democracy Promotion and Its Impact on 
Civil–Military Relations,” in Global Politics of Defense Reform (New York: Palgrave, 2008), 62–63.  
41 David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, “Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore Defense 
Policy in Latin America,” Latin America Research Review 42, no. 3(October 2007). 
42 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Introduction,” in Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson eds., Who 
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of relapses to military and authoritarian rule,43 deteriorating public security and trans-
national criminal activity provide the greatest challenges to positive civil–military 
relations and continued democracy. In 2015, then-commander of U.S. Southern 
Command, General John Kelly, remarked that  
any government has an absolute responsibility to provide security to its 
people, and if they’re so overwhelmed by crime that their police, whether 
they’re clean or not…can’t keep up with it and you have a military that 
can help I don’t see a country having any alternative. It is very interesting 
to me in many of the countries that I work in that the military…are 
considered to be the most respected, admired, and effective parts of the 
government.44  
Trust in the military is evaluated as high, however, in relative terms when 
compared to other largely unpopular government agencies, and the levels of trust in the 
military vary significantly from country to country, as is shown in this thesis. 
Civilian governments in Latin America face the need to continue providing public 
security to its citizenry. A state’s failure to provide security within its borders could see a 
society give in to a fear of social violence whereby citizens look for other means to 
acquire security.45 Much like Colombia of only a decade ago, parts of Mexico provide a 
troubling, contemporary example of civilians forming autonomous defense forces—
called autodefensas—in the absence of a capable government and the rule of law.46 
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Another disturbing phenomenon exists in parts of rural Central and South America, 
where lynch mobs carry out expedient justice due to a void of competent state agencies.47 
In recent years, Latin American militaries have been increasingly called on to aid 
in the effort of providing domestic security. Under these circumstances there is a 
heightened need to maintain positive civil–military relations—and the task is shared by 
civilian leaders in their assignment and oversight of roles and missions as well as the 
military’s effective execution of those missions.  
While the literature on civil–military relations in Latin America has started to 
evaluate the expanded roles and missions of the military, more study is required on 
mission effectiveness—both in how effectively the military undertakes the missions and 
how astutely civilian governments assign and oversee them.  
The political phenomenon of “Bolivarianism” or “radical populism” in Latin 
America has garnered significant attention among scholars and the media. In fact, 
Deborah Norden has studied the effects that three populist presidents—Hugo Chávez of 
Venezuela, Rafael Correa of Ecuador, and Evo Morales of Bolivia—have had on civil–
military relations. She predicts that “the nature of the government to which the armed 
forces owe their loyalty has changed drastically. Given this political transformation, one 
would expect commensurate tensions in the sphere of civil–military relations.”48 
Norden’s assessment is troubling, as she finds that all three militaries have “expanded 
roles and prerogatives” and that “the leaders who will ultimately replace these three 
strongly personalistic populist leaders—whether sooner or later—will inevitably face 
highly politicized militaries, with broadly defined roles and substantial budgets.”49  
While much attention has been given to the “Bolivarian Revolution” among some 
Latin American nations in the last decade, a quieter phenomenon goes understudied—that 
                                                 
47 María Cristina Fernández García, “Lynching in Guatemala: Legacy of War and Impunity,” Harvard 
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of the presidential electoral victories of former insurgents. This thesis continues the study 
of effectiveness in newly assigned military missions while also undertaking the intriguing 
and overlooked task of ex-insurgent presidents and their effect on civil–military relations. 
C. FRAMEWORK 
The research of this thesis first presents a new methodology to assess 
contemporary civil–military relations in Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay. But first, a 
working definition of “positive civil–military relations” is proposed. The definition draws 
from Thomas Bruneau who submitted that civil–military relations are a “balance between 
democratic civilian leadership and military effectiveness in achieving roles and 
missions.”50 This view highlights both the need for an engaged corps of elected, civilian 
leaders as well as a competent and professional military that obeys civilian control. For 
this analysis, positive civil–military relations is a set of institutions interacting in a single 
political structure, whereby civilian politicians actively assign, monitor, and control 
military roles and missions and the military effectively carries them out. 
Building on the “trinity” framework developed by Thomas Bruneau, Cristiana 
Matei, and other scholars of the Naval Postgraduate School’s CCMR, an adjusted three-
pillar model is proposed. The CCMR “trinity” has been described and applied at length in 
Who Guards the Guardians and How and more recently in the Routledge Handbook of 
Civil–Military Relations.51 As described in the preceding literature review, the “trinity” 
consists of Democratic Control, Effectiveness, and Efficiency. For the analysis of this 
thesis, the first two pillars remain largely unchanged; however, Efficiency is replaced 
with the new pillar of Democratic Incorporation of the Military.  
The reason for this change is twofold. First, efficiency is difficult to measure and 
accurately assess. This shortfall is acknowledged by the CCMR scholars and is often 
assessed on a whole-of-government analysis of Supreme Auditing Institutions. In order to 
                                                 
50 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Introduction,” in Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson eds., Who 
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51 Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, eds.. Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic 
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focus the assessment more narrowly on civil–military relations—and to aim at a target 
with more measurable metrics—the pillar is replaced in the proposed framework. Second, 
neither of the other two pillars in the CCMR framework sufficiently analyzes the military 
as an instrument of the state working in conjunction with other tools of the state. That is, 
positive civil–military relations should feature a military institution that works toward 
broader national goals and interests. For this, the new pillar of Democratic Incorporation 
of the Military is introduced. 
To assess the three countries and determine the extent to which positive civil–
military relations can be observed, the framework shown in Table 2 is used. Each field is 
assessed as Low, Medium, or High based on its impact on achieving positive civil–
military relations.  
 
















Brazil    
El Salvador    
Uruguay    
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1. Democratic Incorporation of the Military 
Column 1 is assessed based on a review of each country’s constitution, 
legislation, military doctrine, and the relationship between the military and other state 
institutions to include the presidency. Three questions are asked:  
 Are roles and missions subject to political whim or are they codified; that 
is, are military roles only de facto or are they also de jure?  
 Have there been new restrictions imposed on the military (e.g., prohibiting 
law enforcement, removal from intelligence operations); that is, has the 
military been “shunned” or “quartered” under ex-insurgent presidents?  
 Is the military incorporated into greater national policy, both domestic and 
foreign? 
2. Democratic Oversight of the Military 
Column 2 is assessed based on civilian oversight of military actions—both current 
missions and past abuses. Oversight mechanisms in the executive, legislative, and judicial 
realms are analyzed. Three questions are asked: 
 Is there a civilian Minister of Defense and does he or she control the 
military and its budget?  
 Do civilian politicians expend the required political capital to oversee 
military operations, or is there still a “lack of incentives?” 
 Does the military operate within the legal framework—both presently and 
in accounting for the past era of military repression; that is, does the 
military receive exemptions or amnesty for current operations or past 
abuses? 
3. Military Effectiveness under Democracy 
Column 3 is assessed based on analyzing current and recent military operations, 
military budgets, and the relationship between the military and other state institutions. 
Three questions are asked: 
 Does the military “creep” into unassigned roles or supplant non-military 
state capacity? 
 Do democratic leaders supply their militaries with ample resources, 
especially as they assign them new roles and missions? 
 Has the military successfully executed its democratically assigned 
missions? 
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D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The remainder of the thesis is presented in four additional chapters. Chapters II, 
III, and IV provide a brief military history of each country as well as a biography of the 
country’s ex-insurgent president and status of contemporary civil–military relations. 
Chapter V applies the findings to the aforementioned framework and provides final 
trends and results.  
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II. BRAZIL 
Brazil is the largest nation in Latin America and spends the most on its military. 
The military has played a unique role in Brazilian history. On the one hand, Brazil’s 
independence from Portugal was a relatively peaceful process with little role for the 
military, especially as compared to the armed struggle for independence in Spanish 
America. On the other hand, the Brazilian military has intervened in domestic politics 
multiple times and has been described as “the moderating power” (o poder moderador) 
arbitrating between rival factions or replacing inept civilian regimes.52 This historical 
background provides a mixed foundation for contemporary civil–military relations. The 
first section of this chapter gives a brief military history of Brazil from 1964 to present. 
The second section offers a biography of ex-guerrilla and first-ever woman president of 
Brazil, Dilma Rousseff. The third section analyzes contemporary civil–military relations 
in Brazil. The chapter concludes with a depiction of President Rousseff as a stern 
commander-in-chief carefully continuing the legacy of using Brazil’s military as a 
“handyman” for the homeland. 
A. BRAZILIAN MILITARY HISTORY: 1964–PRESENT 
In the 1960s, under civilian president João Goulart, Brazilian society was highly 
politicized and increasingly unsettled. Ideological divisions caused tensions that often 
manifested in workers’ strikes and student protests. Very much aware of the successful 
socialist revolution in Cuba, the Brazilian military assessed domestic unrest and 
radicalism as a threat to national security. The Brazilian military developed a national 
security doctrine at its War College (Escola Superior de Guerra, or ESG) and educated 
military and civilians on a wide range of security topics such as intelligence, political 
affairs, psychological-social affairs, and even economic development.53 A growing cadre 
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 22
of Brazilians associated with the ESG and other state institutions “became convinced that 
only an armed movement would put an end to populist anarchy and stop the spread of 
Communism.”54 In April 1964, the Brazilian military launched a coup d’état that forced 
President Goulart into exile and began twenty-one years of military authoritarian rule. 
While not as violent as the military dictatorships in Argentina and Chile, the 
Brazilian military did engage in many of the same purging activities to seek out and 
eliminate radicals and insurgents. The most intensive period was from 1968 to 1974 and 
has been referred to as the Leaden Years (Anos de Chumbo) due to the suspension of civil 
liberties, increased repression, and counterinsurgency operations by the military regime 
to include tortures and killings. A 2014 Brazilian Truth Commission report accounts for 
191 killings and 243 disappearances during the dictatorship.  
The military regime initiated a prolonged transition to democracy that began 
immediately following the Anos de Chumbo; moderate President (General) Ernesto 
Geisel began a program of mild relaxation of heavy-handed authoritarian rule, called 
distensão, and civil society was re-opened with a gradual restoration of liberties, called 
abertura. Brazilians elected a civilian president in 1985 and a new constitution was 
drafted in 1988. While the slow processes of distensão and abertura eventually led to 
democratic elections, the transition was largely guided by the military, allowing for 
continued military privileges such as amnesty for past human rights abuses and continued 
military management of some state enterprises. Furthermore, the first civilian presidents 
inherited a weak national economy that was plagued with very high inflation—an ailment 
that was not cured until then–Finance Minister (and later, President) Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso’s Real Plan in 1994. 
The Brazilian government was slow to reform civil–military relations, largely 
because of the government’s focus on economic reforms. As noted by Reid, “the three 
separate military ministries were merged into a single defence ministry under civilian 
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control only in 2000—a decade or more after most Latin American countries.”55 While 
the Brazilian military’s role as o poder moderador formally ended with the indirect 
democratic elections of 1985, the full transition of informal power and influence in 
government affairs did not occur until much later. 
B. DILMA THE “IRON LADY” INSURGENT 
In 2009, following the second four-year term held by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, 
the Leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) nominated ex-guerrilla insurgent turned 
economist Dilma Rousseff. The following paragraphs provide a background of Rousseff. 
Dilma Rousseff was raised in an upper-middle-class household to a Bulgarian 
immigrant father and Brazilian mother. During her university studies, Rousseff became 
politically active in a growing Leftist movement that resisted the military government of 
the 1960s and 1970s; she became a declared Marxist heavily involved with the 
underground insurgency. Her involvement was initially as an accomplice to robberies and 
weapons smuggling; later she became more influential as a leader of the Marxist–Leninist 
VAR Palmares insurgent group as a planner and organizer.56 After her capture in 1970, 
Dilma was imprisoned for three years where she was brutally tortured using electric 
shocks and put in the notorious “parrot’s perch” being suspended from metal bars. She 
was finally released and allowed to return to school, despite withstanding torture and not 
giving interrogators information about her underground collaborators. 
Dilma has spoken frequently about her experiences in her insurgent youth, often 
making comparisons to her political setbacks and the resolve she has to continue the 
struggle to achieve her political visions.57 Furthermore, Dilma has rebuked critics of her 
guerrilla past, pointing to the courage of the insurgents and the barbarity of the military 
regime: “anyone who dared tell the truth to their torturers would compromise the lives of 
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their friends. They would deliver them to their deaths.”58 After completing her studies in 
economics, Dilma began a long career as a civil servant. 
Dilma Rousseff first took public office in 1985 as the Secretary of the Treasury in 
the southern city of Porto Alegre. She later moved to the position of Secretary of Energy 
in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, as a part of the governing Democratic Labor Party 
(PDT). In 2000, she left the PDT to join the Partido dos Trabalhadores, which had been 
founded by the charismatic union leader turned politician Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. 
Rousseff was installed as the Minister of Energy in President Lula’s first term and, 
following the mensalão corruption scandal, was made Chief of Staff in 2005. The close 
relationship developed with President Lula ultimately led to his personal endorsement of 
Dilma Rousseff to become the PT’s nominee in the 2010 presidential election. 
Dilma Rousseff has been portrayed as a stern leader lacking much of the charisma 
that buoyed her predecessor’s popularity. She has been called an “iron lady” not because 
of her insurgent past, but as a result of her public reprimands of her subordinates and her 
cold disregard of criticism. While this resolve can be a source of strength in times of 
adversity, her approach to the presidency has led to a more fractious political 
environment and a very disgruntled Brazilian population. Many critics point to Rousseff, 
a career technocrat resistant to political compromise, as the source of much of Brazil’s 
current economic and political woes. While this is too large a blame to put on one person, 
Dilma Rousseff has not helped dissuade her detractors. 
C. CONTEMPORARY CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN BRAZIL 
The Brazilian military regime led the slow transition back to democracy, retaining 
certain privileges after leaving power. After presidential elections in 1985, reforms to 
civil–military relations did not take place for many years. Brazil has a history of corrupt 
governance and high levels of patrimonialism—two phenomena that result in a cynical 
population toward Brazilian democracy. Only 48.5% of the population agrees that 
democracy is the most preferable form of government, according to regional pollster 
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Latinobarometro.59 Looking deeper into polling data reveals seemingly paradoxical 
results: Brazilians have very high trust in their armed forces (third highest in Latin 
America), yet are the most adamant among Latin Americans that the armed forces should 
not govern.60 Much like the puzzling polling data, the Brazilian government seems to 
have mixed ideas on how to maintain and utilize its military. 
It is well known that Brazil is a large country by many measurements (e.g., 
population, land mass, Gross Domestic Product). A common criticism of Brazil has been 
an inability to utilize this strength of size by way of regional or global leadership.61 
While issues such as political instability, rampant inflation, or a large percentage of its 
population living in poverty have been hindrances in the past, Brazil has been poised to 
take on more leadership in recent years. Cardoso’s Real Plan finally curbed inflation; 
Lula’s bolsa familia and other social programs reduced poverty. Recent administrations 
have both continued Brazil’s use of multilateralism as well as pursued military 
modernization as a means to further Brazil’s foreign policy aspirations; yet, despite 
having a military that seeks power projections abroad, Brazil has routinely used its 
military domestically to quell violent favelas and suppress narcotrafficking in the 
Amazon. In some respects, Brazil has codified the roles and missions of its military; 
however, Brazil frequently reverts to its inward orientation and uses its military as a 
“handyman” to respond to pressing needs—often at the expense of long-term, strategic 
goals. While Brazil has made advances in the last twenty years, consistency has been the 
missing component to positive civil–military relations. 
The following sections apply the civil–military relations framework to Brazil and 
assess the democratic incorporation of its military, the democratic oversight of its 
military, and the military effectiveness under Brazilian democracy. 
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1. Democratic Incorporation of the Military 
The Brazilian military was a largely autonomous entity within Brazil even after 
return to democracy in 1985. Generals served at the cabinet level and retained high levels 
of influence in non-military matters such as intelligence and state enterprises. Significant 
reforms to incorporate the Brazilian military into the democratic government began under 
President Cardoso in 1996 with the National Defense Policy, a first in the history of 
Brazil. This important first step was followed in 2008 with a National Defense Strategy 
(Estrategia Nacional de Defesa, or END) and in 2012 with the White Book on National 
Defense (Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional). Each of these was a first for Brazil and was 
significant not only for the guidance and transparency they provided to defense but also 
in that “civilians played a prominent role in drafting key defense policy documents.”62 
According to the Commander of the Brazilian Army, General Villas Bôas, “for the first 
time, the political powers told the military what their concept was of the armed forces, 
and what they understood as necessary for Brazil.”63 The publication of these documents 
is of dual significance: the military ceded autonomy to the civilian government and 
civilians began to focus increased attention to the management of defense institutions. 
While the publication of defense policy documents are important to codifying 
roles and responsibilities of the military as well as providing transparency to the 
previously “off-limits” parts of the government, the ministers of defense in Brazil from 
1999 to 2007 “were not politically powerful figures within the government” who did not 
“have the authority to make their preferences fully prevail over those of the military.”64 
This changed in 2007 with the appointment of Nelson Jobim as Minister of Defense, a 
“heavyweight politico” providing unprecedented leverage to defense matters at the 
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cabinet level.65 As Minister of Defense, Jobim not only passed the END but also engaged 
in public dialogue to align defense priorities with broader national priorities. The 
formulation of the END was the product of consultation with “representatives of various 
public and private agencies, as well as knowledgeable citizens in the area of Defense, in 
addition to the Commanders of the three branches of the Armed Forces.”66 Roles 
assigned to the military branches supported national priorities to include defense of the 
Amazon, creation of a blue-water navy to project power abroad, and the link between 
Brazil’s defense strategy with its development strategy. This final assertion is made 
unequivocally in the END: “The national strategy of defense is inseparable from the 
national strategy of development. The latter drives the former. The former provides 
shielding to the latter.”67 Since its first publication in 2008, the END has been revised in 
its second edition in 2012 under President Rousseff. 
While Brazil has grand strategic goals for its military—most notably in 
developing nuclear-powered submarines in defense of the “Blue Amazon” and 
modernizing its fleet of fighter jets—the Brazilian military is also engaged in the less 
revered role of supporting police missions. The Brazilian military is not constitutionally 
restricted from engaging in domestic security and has been activated to support state and 
municipal police forces both during mass events (e.g., the 2013 World Youth Day and the 
2014 World Cup) and for prolonged operations to pacify violent favelas in Rio de 
Janeiro. Such uses are an improvement on the past, when the military initiated domestic 
security operations; however, despite being directed by civilian authorities, “the push-pull 
that leads to the military’s involvement in state and local policing emphasizes the need 
for institutional strengthening.”68 Positive civil–military relations are hampered when the 
military are routinely used as relief for traditional institutions of law enforcement. 
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Bruneau and Tollefson make the compelling case that Brazilian democracy has 
consolidated in the last twenty years, and that “civil–military relations have evolved in 
the context of this broad democratic deepening.”69 With long-standing ambitions in 
domestic development and in the elevation of its stature on the world stage, Brazil has 
looked at its military as one of many tools to achieve these ambitions. While the military 
is incorporated into Brazilian democracy, there is still a struggle between the long-term 
military aspirations with the short-term assistance to law enforcement required 
domestically. 
2. Democratic Oversight of the Military  
Brazil established the Ministry of Defense in 1999 and has had nine Ministers 
since—all civilians. The civilian minister replaced the military from its cabinet position 
in the government and is the chief representative of the military on both the National 
Defense Council and the Military Council of Defense, two separate advising councils to 
the President of Brazil.70 While the Ministry of Defense has been praised as a key 
milestone in Brazilian civil–military relations, especially as a means to exercise civilian 
control, the institutional capacity is limited by its lack of a broad civilian cadre. Bruneau 
and Tollefson point out that “there is no career track [consurso] within the MOD…which 
results in civilians having minimal roles.”71 Part of this deficit may be attributed to a lack 
of civilians knowledgeable in defense and capable of filling these roles. If so, recent 
trends may aid in this shortcoming.  
Since 2011, a government-funded contract solicitation (edital) has resulted in two 
programs to boost science and technology research in universities focused on national 
defense (Pró-Defesa) and national strategic issues (Pró-Estratégia). Furthermore, “an 
epistemic community is emerging in Brazil that is focused on issues of security and 
defense,” to include the 2005 founding of the Brazilian Association of Defense Studies 
(Associação Brazileira de Estudos de Defesa) with annual conferences and an academic 
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journal.72 In 2009, the Ministry of Defense began talks of establishing a research institute 
to conduct strategic studies of regional and international defense. The Instituto Pandiá 
Calógeras, named after Brazil’s first civilian Minister of War in 1919, has since 
employed a civilian cadre to act as a think tank for the Ministry of Defense.73 While this 
is a step in the right direction to building a properly staffed Ministry of Defense, the issue 
remains that civilians only work on defense as opposed to working with and in defense as 
members of the Ministry of Defense staff. 
The emergence of broader civilian defense knowledge will also aid in legislative 
oversight of the military. Both the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies and Senate have 
congressional oversight of the military granted by the 1988 Constitution, and have 
committees dedicated to this role. Until recently, however, the legislative branch has 
“abdicated their lawmaking authority in favor of the executive branch.”74 Congress 
typically relied on “fire alarms” to be sounded by interest groups rather than employ 
institutional oversight mechanisms such as public hearings and official inquiries.75 
Octavio Amorim Neto points out that the current trend is constructive and that the 
“Brazilian legislature has recently begun to take back the authority over national 
defense.” This is a positive sign that Brazilian politicians are expending increased 
political capital in defense matters—a relative anomaly in Latin America. 
Broad governmental oversight in Brazil is conducted by the Federal Public 
Ministry (Ministério Publico) and is not prevented from targeting the military in its role 
of defending public interest and ensuring governmental accountability. Bruneau and 
Tollefson point out that “the Public Ministry is extremely powerful and autonomous in 
defending public interest. All who are in public life in Brazil are aware of its immense 
powers, and it can act as a deterrent to public abuse, including in the area of national 
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security and defense.”76 Recent scholarship in Brazil concurs with Bruneau and 
Tollefson’s assessment on the role of the Ministério Publico and begins the task of 
showing empirically that it has effectively carried out civilian oversight of the military in 
the last decade.77 
An additional oversight mechanism was employed by President Dilma Rousseff 
in the launching of a Truth Commission to investigate human rights abuses during the 
military dictatorship. Human rights violations are an unresolved issue in Brazil, largely 
due to the 1979 Amnesty Law granting protections to members of the armed forces and 
the government from 1961 to 1979. In 2009, in an attempt to develop a national inquiry 
into past abuses, President Lula faced strong opposition from the military when he 
attempted to form a truth commission. In two setbacks, President Lula backed away from 
establishing a truth commission after military opposition and, in 2010, a Brazilian court 
upheld the 1979 Amnesty Law.  
President Rousseff was successful in delivering a Truth Commission in 2011 and 
received congressional endorsement; however, the commission was limited to 
investigative duties and received no authority to prosecute. The final report of the 7-
member Truth Commission, was released in late 2014 and gives “a damning portrayal of 
the military’s actions, including killings, torture, sexual violence and forced 
disappearances.”78 The report also recommends prosecution for abuses—something not 
pursued by Rousseff. Speaking at an event to release the Truth Commission’s final 
report, President Rousseff proclaimed that “we, who believe in the truth, hope that this 
report contributes to make it so that ghosts from a sad and painful past are no longer able 
to find shelter in silence.”79 While the Amnesty Law still stands, the Truth Commission 
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provided some level of healing to Brazil. The military, however, still has not been held 
accountable for past abuses. 
The institutions of Brazilian democracy have increased their oversight of the 
armed forces, largely pushed by a recent increase in interest from civil society. While 
Rousseff’s Truth Commission was a positive step to account for past abuses, the Amnesty 
Law still provides protections for past human rights crimes committed by the Brazilian 
military. 
3. Military Effectiveness under Democracy 
The Brazilian military is not only the most capable Latin American military, it 
also has the widest range of military roles. As defined by the 1988 Constitution and in 
subsequent national laws in 1999 and 2010, the Brazilian armed forces are responsible for 
defending national sovereignty, protecting law and order, participating in peacekeeping 
operations, supporting national development, combatting transnational and environmental 
crimes, aiding in emergency response, and securing national borders.80 With such 
widespread responsibilities there is a concern that the Brazilian military remains the 
government’s “handyman” called on to address any number of problems. Not 
surprisingly, law enforcement in Brazil has been criticized as having become 
“militarized,” causing an increase in the violence that the military had been called in to 
subdue.81 Similarly, there is concern that the military has experienced a “police-ization” 
whereby what was intended to be short-term support for law enforcement has seen 
successive administrations continue the use of the military to take on police missions.82 
There was speculation that this mission may desist after the election of Dilma Rousseff; 
however, only a month after her election, Rousseff called on soldiers to continue in their 
mission supporting the Pacifying Police Units in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas. 
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President Rousseff did place increased emphasis on a different role of the 
military, however, as she called on the military to increase assistance to national 
development: 
The fundamental priority of my government is, as you all know, to 
eliminate poverty in Brazil. For this I count on the armed forces. Their 
wide experience in social work, carried out all across the homeland, 
reaching out to the furthermost and most remote regions is invaluable for 
us to achieve this essential goal.83 
The military’s support of national development is not a new phenomenon—in 
fact, defense and development are decried as “inseparable” in the END—but from the 
perspective of positive civil–military relations there is concern that the military’s use for 
such missions can supplant state capacity from developing in other institutions. Brazil’s 
use of its military as a “handyman” can lead to this same concern in its police force, 
border patrol, and from establishing basic government presence in the Amazon region. In 
all of these deficiencies to state capacity, the military has been called in to assist. 
The Brazilian military has been a leader in UN Peacekeeping Operations 
(UNPKO)—both in the number of personnel deployed and in assuming the lead role in 
multinational operations. Brazil routinely has over 1,500 troops deployed to as many as 
nine different UNPKOs.84 In 2004, Brazil took command of the mission in Haiti and in 
2011 took lead of the maritime task force for the UNPKO in Lebanon. As a strong 
proponent of international organizations and multilateralism, Brazil’s commitment to UN 
Peacekeeping underscores its longstanding bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council. 
In terms of defense spending, Brazil is the outright leader in Latin America. 
Despite recent economic hardships, Jane’s reports that “national security investment 
appears to remain high priority for President Dilma Rousseff, who is likely to commit 
significant sums to national border and maritime boundary security.”85 Across-the-board 
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budget cuts have hurt some military programs, although Brazil still has ambitious, long-
term procurement programs to attain nuclear-powered submarines (PROSUB) and SAAB 
Gripen fighter jets.86 Since 2002, overall defense spending has increased as the Brazilian 
economy experienced high growth (see Figure 2). The defense budget as a percent of 
GDP has remained very constant, at an average of 1.61% of GDP—above the Latin 
American average of 1.28% of GDP.87 The Brazilian military is well-funded and cuts in 
spending have resulted from recent economic woes, not as a means to restrict or punish. 
Figure 2.  Brazil’s Defense Budget 
 
Adapted from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (The Military Balance) 
The Brazilian military is a well-funded force, especially by regional standards. 
Much like national ambitions for an elevated stature in the world, the Brazilian military 
seeks world-class technologies and the ability to project power abroad. Both military and 
broader national ambitions are restrained, however, by the need to tend to matters at 
home. The military is routinely employed as a “handyman” to assist underdeveloped or 
overwhelmed state and municipal agencies, most notably in the violent favelas. In order 
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for the military to elevate to world-class effectiveness, it should be relieved of domestic 
missions and engage more proactively with other modern and professional militaries. 
D. THE ROUSSEFF LEGACY 
Dilma Rousseff, the once-Marxist insurgent who was captured and tortured by the 
military, was elected president of Brazil in 2010. As the hand-picked successor of the 
popular Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, many waited to see how President Rousseff would 
engage the military. Much of the institutionalization of positive civil–military relations 
had been accomplished by her two predecessors, most notably the creation of a civilian-
led Ministry of Defense and a set of new national policy documents. President Rousseff 
did, however, take two of her own actions that would put the military in the spotlight and 
serve as reminder to a new age of civil–military relations. 
The first was the successful launching of a Truth Commission to formally present 
facts of human rights abuse under the military regime. The second action was a warning 
sign to the military, with a focus on shifting Brazil’s military culture: Rousseff “imposed 
a ban on commemorations of the civilian-military coup d’état, referred to by the military 
as a revolution.”88 As if to ensure that the culture of democracy was fully ingrained in the 
military, President Rousseff remarked that “a country, such as Brazil, that relies on armed 
forces characterized by a close attachment to their constitutional duties, is a country that 
has corrected its own ways and reached a high level of institutional maturity.”89 While 
neither action may be seen as transformative to the institutions of positive civil–military 
relations, the symbolic effect is powerful and has provided a cultural shift to relations 
between Brazil’s armed forces and civilian government. 
In an interview with a Brazilian newspaper in September 2015, Commander of 
the Army, General Villas Bôas expresses a concern that procurement programs to 
modernize the armed forces are at risk due to a decline in the military budget. Villas Bôas 
does not cite political motives to the “interruption” to the military modernization that 
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these cuts have created, rather broad economic hardships in Brazil.90 His comments 
portray a Brazilian military that exists on “two poles”: one is the traditional role of 
waging war while the other is rendering public services.91 Ultimately, the General 
concludes that the Brazilian military must be ready to “attend to the demands of the 
population.”92 When asked about the Brazilian’s Army’s concern with the on-going 
economic and political crises in Brazil, General Villas Bôas seems to understand the 
military’s place in Brazil’s new civil–military relations: “today Brazil has institutions that 
are very well structured, solid, and functioning perfectly, completing their tasks, that 
safeguard society. There are no shortcuts to the Constitution.”93  
Both from the creation of strong defense institutions and through a shift in the 
culture of Brazilian civil–military relations, many strides forward have been made over 
the last decade. Considering the economic and political turmoil facing Brazil in 2016, the 
region’s and the world’s eyes will closely monitor Brazil and hope for stability in Latin 
America’s largest country. 
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III. EL SALVADOR 
El Salvador has some of the most pressing security challenges in Latin America. 
Gang networks and a spillover of drug trafficking violence have made El Salvador one of 
the most dangerous countries in the region and the world. Furthermore, a twelve-year 
civil war tore the country apart, only coming to a UN-brokered peace accord in 1992. The 
end of the war saw significant changes to civil–military relations; however, recent uses of 
the military to enforce harsh anti-gang measures make civil–military relations inundated 
with immense challenges. In 2009, the former insurgent movement turned political party 
won the presidency for the first time. Following the presidency of former journalist 
Mauricio Funes, the FMLN retained the office when Salvador Sánchez Cerén, an ex-
guerrilla commander, took over in 2014. The democratic transition in 2009 between 
former civil war enemies was peaceful and a milestone for the deepening of Salvadoran 
democracy; however, widespread violence, corruption and inequality plague the nation 
creating significant challenges to positive civil–military relations. The first section gives 
a brief military history of El Salvador from 1979 to the present. The second section offers 
a succinct biography of ex-insurgent leader Salvador Sánchez Cerén, known during the 
civil war as “Comandante Leonel González.” The third section analyzes contemporary 
civil–military relations in El Salvador. The chapter concludes with a portrayal of 
President Sánchez Cerén’s legacy as one that is still incomplete but thus far has a mixed 
record toward achieving positive civil–military relations. 
A. SALVADORAN MILITARY HISTORY: 1979–PRESENT 
The military in El Salvador has a bloody history of allegiance to the small 
minority of conservative elite landholders. Often changing hands between military 
officers and powerful oligarchs, the presidency was rarely achieved by legitimate popular 
consent of the people of El Salvador in the 19th and early 20th Centuries. Democratic 
reform was a very dangerous endeavor, as exemplified by the notorious 1932 massacre of 
over 30,000 peasant activists (known as “la Matanza”) under the government of General 
Maximiliano Hernández Martínez. The organizer of the activists, Augustín Farabundo 
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Martí, did not survive la Matanza; however, later government opposition would rally 
under his name. 
Even after la Matanza, the military of El Salvador was used to stabilize the 
country and suppress government resistance. In the 1970s, a number of factors led to a 
decrease in military control of the population, to include a growing communist movement 
inspired by the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions, and an active Catholic Church calling 
for social justice and an end to violence—led by Archbishop Oscar Romero.94 In 
response to growing unrest in the mid-1970s, the newly formed paramilitary group 
Organización Democrática Nacionalista (ORDEN) sought out members of several 
guerrilla organizations, killing hundreds.95  
In 1979, an attempt was made by a group of officers to scale back repression and 
a bloodless coup d’état put a new civilian-military junta in power. As described by a 
Salvadoran officer, “a new generation of officers, believing that [the military was] 
established to serve the entire civilian population and not just a small part of 
it…projected a new line of military thinking that invoked human rights, political 
pluralism, and electoral reform.”96 The efforts were unsuccessful at providing a peaceful 
political transition, however, as “the restructuring of the junta and rising official violence 
quickly alienated much of the center and left.”97 The previously disjointed opposition 
formed a single, unified insurgent movement called the Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (FMLN).  
Violence spiked in 1980, reaching over 11,000 killed by official government 
estimates.98 Victims were not limited to the declared belligerents of the conservative 
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military government and heavily armed Marxist guerrillas; hundreds of bystanders and 
over a dozen religious clergy were killed to include the assassination of Archbishop 
Romero while celebrating mass. The civil war in El Salvador, in the greater context of the 
Cold War, was viewed by the United States much the same as in fellow Central American 
nations Guatemala and Nicaragua. In an effort to contain the spread of communism, the 
United States supplied significant aid to the military while the FMLN received periodic 
support from the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.99 Civil war endured for a total of 
twelve years in El Salvador, resulting in over 70,000 killed and over a sixth of the 
population leaving the country to escape the violence.100 
In 1992, war came to an end with a UN-brokered peace treaty. The treaty cut by 
half the size of the armed forces, demilitarized the FMLN, and created it as a legal 
political party. A UN truth commission was also launched that, upon publication of its 
report in 1993, declared that 85% of all deaths were attributed to the military, ORDEN, 
and “death squad” operations.101 Immediately following the release of the truth 
commission report, the Salvadoran legislature passed an amnesty law that provided legal 
protection to crimes committed during the war. 
Democratic elections have taken place since the 1992 peace, with the presidency 
and the majority of seats in the legislature won by the conservative party, ARENA. In 
2000, the FMLN gained in popularity and became the largest party in El Salvador’s 
unicameral legislature. Under ARENA presidencies, and largely due to widespread 
unemployment and post-war arms proliferation, Salvadorans experienced increases in 
gang violence and an economy that relied heavily on remittances from emigrants to the 
United States; to gain popularity with a tough-on-crime image, ARENA introduced a 
mano dura program and campaigned on turning around a deteriorating security 
environment.102 Mano dura, or “iron fist,” gave wide authority to “joint police-military 
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anti-gang squads” to detain suspected gang members with little or no criminal evidence; 
critics have pointed out that the policy’s primary goal was “not to curb street gang 
activity but to improve the ARENA party’s electoral advantage in the eight-month run-up 
to the 2004 presidential elections.”103 Public security, in fact, has not improved since the 
implementation of mano dura policies and the country has been at or near the top of 
regional and global homicide rates over the last decade.104  
In 2009, Mauricio Funes became the first FMLN president of El Salvador. After 
his election, President Funes continued and even increased many of the anti-gang 
programs of his predecessor, dispatching the military into high-crime neighborhoods. 
Despite the demilitarization of the police force in the 1992 peace treaty, Funes used the 
military to aid in law enforcement missions and even appointed a former military general 
as the minister of justice and public security.105 President Funes’s vice-president, an ex-
guerrilla commander during the civil war, was nominated by the FMLN in the 2014 
runoff elections and won with just over 50% of the popular vote. 
B. INSURGENT LEADER “COMANDANTE GONZÁLEZ” 
Salvador Sánchez Cerén was born and raised in rural El Salvador and studied to 
become a teacher in the capital city, San Salvador. In 1972, in his late 20s, Sánchez Cerén 
joined the left wing Fuerzas Populares de Liberación, one of the five core movements 
that would later join to form the FMLN. Other core movements included the clandestine 
and armed Salvadoran communist party and the national armed resistance. According to 
his presidential biography, Sánchez Cerén always insisted that the only way to end the 
civil war was through a political solution.106 Sánchez Cerén was an active member of the 
armed guerrilla forces and became a high-ranking commander. He took the nom-de-
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guerre of Comandante Leonel González and led insurgent military operations for several 
years. 
As the 12-year civil war neared its end, Sánchez Cerén was a lead FMLN 
negotiator working with the ARENA government, the United Nations, and other 
mediators to draft and eventually sign the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords. Sánchez 
Cerén was first elected to public office as a deputy (representative) to the national 
legislature in 2000 and was re-elected in 2003 and 2006. Given his background as a 
teacher, as a deputy Sánchez Cerén strove to reform El Salvador’s education system and 
expand youth opportunities.107 
The FMLN nominated Mauricio Funes as presidential candidate in the 2009 
election, in part to soften the image of the former insurgent political party. Funes was a 
journalist during the civil war with sympathies for the FMLN cause. It was with some 
surprise, then, that Salvador Sánchez Cerén was selected as his running-mate. While 
serving as vice president, Sánchez Cerén also took on the “voluntary” duties as Minister 
of Education for a three-year period where he pushed for greater education for the poor 
and extended food services in public schools, according to his biography.108 Despite 
large leads in early polling, Salvador Sánchez Cerén was elected president of El Salvador 
in 2014 by a very narrow margin. He was depicted by his ARENA adversaries as a 
militant and socialist and likened to Hugo Chavez; a more favorable comparison has also 
been made to the ex-insurgent president of Uruguay, Jose Mujíca.109 With comparisons 
aside, Sánchez Cerén has taken his own approach to the monumental challenges facing 
present-day El Salvador. 
C. CONTEMPORARY CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN EL SALVADOR 
A number of demilitarizing programs were included in the 1992 Chapultepec 
Peace Accords that ended the civil war. In addition to the demobilization of guerrilla 
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fighters and the establishment of the FMLN as a legitimate political party, the most 
significant reforms to civil–military relations included the dissolution of the National 
Police Force, National Guard, and Treasury Police as well as the creation of a separate 
Ministry of Public Security (previously under the Ministry of Defense) with an entirely 
civilian police force. The new structure removed the three aforementioned police 
agencies from military control and re-populated the new National Civil Police (Policia 
Nacional Civil, PNC) with former members of the government police and insurgent 
forces.110 Additionally, new institutions with a blend of civilian and military cadre were 
established to reform police and military education as well as to train the PNC and 
military cadets.111 
In addition to the challenges presented by past and current violence in El 
Salvador, historically weak institutions and a limited state capacity make for a difficult 
environment to attain positive civil–military relations. When polled, Salvadorans have a 
weak support for democracy as the preferred method of government—just under half of 
the population in favor—and have very low confidence in their judicial system and police 
forces.112 Surprisingly, however, Salvadorans have very high trust in their armed forces; 
at 70.4%, El Salvador has the region’s second-highest confidence in its military.113 This 
high level of public trust is one reason for successive governments to employ the military 
in support of law enforcement missions domestically. 
Civil–military relations in El Salvador suffer many of the setbacks of other 
aspects of its democratic government. The government generates low tax revenues from 
its population due to low tax rates and a weak capacity to collect from its citizens and 
private companies; corruption is rampant across Central America, especially in the 
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“Northern Triangle” nations of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala; and deep 
inequality and poverty leave large parts of the population vulnerable to poor living 
conditions.114 It is no surprise, then, that many of the institutions of positive civil–
military relations are either weak or altogether absent. Some progress has been made, 
however, since the 1992 Peace Accords, as will be discussed in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
The following sections apply the civil–military relations framework to El 
Salvador and assess the democratic incorporation of its military, the democratic oversight 
of its military, and the military effectiveness under Salvadoran democracy. 
1. Democratic Incorporation of the Military 
The roles of the armed forces of El Salvador were addressed and laid out in the 
peace accords and amended into the constitution, with a focus on the traditional role of 
territorial defense against external threats. There is a stipulation that the military may be 
used in response to emergencies—a clause that has been invoked to allow for the military 
to be employed in support of law enforcement missions. This interpretation of the legal 
authority to dispatch the military domestically was highly criticized for being in conflict 
with the text and tone of the peace accords; however, in 2014 the Salvadoran Supreme 
Court upheld previous executive decrees authorizing the military to continue their law 
enforcement missions.115 Rather than outline a plan to retract the military from their 
“emergency” use at home, the recent trend has been the opposite—most recently 
exemplified by the Sánchez Cerén administration’s dispatching of three 200-man “rapid 
reaction” army battalions to high-crime areas.116 In order to achieve positive civil–
military relations, the concern continues that the de facto roles of the military are not in 
line with their de jure constitutional mandate—an incongruity that should be formally 
addressed by Salvadoran lawmakers considering the foreseeable continuation of domestic 
military use. 
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A second deficiency to the incorporation of the Salvadoran military is the high 
amount of autonomy still allotted to the armed forces. On the one hand, the military is a 
success story of post-conflict settlement between former enemies. High-ranking officers 
were moved out (retired or transitioned to other government jobs) and the remaining 
force was made up of former government soldiers and a contingent of FMLN fighters. On 
the other hand, the military continues to be resistant to democratic incorporation with its 
civilian government. As a strong example of the military’s persistent isolation from 
broader Salvadoran democracy, one civil–military relations scholar notes that “the 
president does not have a free hand in appointing defense ministers; he is constrained by 
the high command, which would not accept a civilian defense minister.”117 
In his first year in office, President Sánchez Cerén has taken a positive first step in 
forming a national security plan. A forum including government, business, church, 
media, academia, and civil society leaders formed a National Council for Citizen Security 
(Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana y Convivencia, or CNSCC). The CNSCC 
resulted in a new security plan, called El Salvador Seguro, to combine existing policing 
efforts with holistic approaches such as violence prevention, job creation, youth outreach, 
criminal rehabilitation, and services for crime victims.118 The costly plan is a success in 
its incorporation of broad segments of society, but the full funding source is not yet 
determined and there is no inclusion of an end-date for domestic military deployments.119 
In sum, there is still considerable work to be accomplished in democratically 
incorporating the military into Salvadoran democracy—a task shared by civilian 
politicians and military leaders. 
2. Democratic Oversight of the Military  
The Minister of National Defense is a military officer and the senior defense 
official under the president, who is commander-in-chief. As previously mentioned, the 
Minister has significant autonomy in his management of the military, a structure that has 
                                                 
117 Zoltan Barany, “Building National Armies after Civil War: Lessons Learned from Bosnia, El 
Salvador, and Lebanon,” Political Science Quarterly 129, no. 2 (2014), 228. 
118 Seelke, El Salvador, 10–11. 
119 El Salvador Seguro has an estimated 5-year cost of $2 Billion; Seelke, El Salvador, 10–11. 
 45
a long historical precedent. One Salvadoran military officer describes the relationship 
between the military and civilian oversight, even after the peace accords: 
The job of supervising the military was viewed as a very dangerous task 
and one that created very powerful adversaries and did not boost one’s 
political career. Therefore, few civilians in civil service wanted to be 
involved in defense-related issues. Instead, they handed that responsibility 
to military personnel.120 
In addition to the Minister of National Defense, the president is also directly 
advised by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on his 8-member National Security 
Council.121 With a military officer serving at the ministerial level and two serving on the 
security advisory council, the executive branch has not adopted the prescribed democratic 
oversight mechanism present in most other modern Latin American militaries: a civilian 
minister of defense. 
The Salvadoran constitution requires the Minister of National Defense to submit a 
budget proposal to the legislature; however, there is a deficiency in defense knowledge 
among the civilian population. This lack of knowledge has been evident in a traditionally 
inactive legislature. The legislative branch does have the structure to conduct military 
oversight, an 11-member National Defense Committee, but the legislators “lack the 
information to ask anything but the most perfunctory questions.”122 That is, the 
legislature has not performed its duties in actively overseeing matters of security and 
defense, despite having a suitable structure in place. Zoltan Barany suggests that an 
“implicit deal” still exists in current civil–military relations whereby “the soldiers stay 
out of politics but the state takes very good care of them.”123 As a result, little scrutiny 
has been conducted by civilian politicians in the funding or management of the military.  
On a regional level, Central American nations have been working to address a 
lack of knowledge on and coordination of security initiatives through conferences and 
U.S.-led programs. The annual Central American Regional Security Conference draws 
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political leaders from across the region to discuss issues with military and police officials 
(including many U.S. officials, such as the Commander of U.S. Southern Command) and 
civilian subject matter experts from all of Central America, as well as other Latin 
American observers.124 U.S. programs, such as the FBI’s National Gang Task Force and 
the State Department’s Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), expand 
training and coordination between the various counter-gang agencies across the region as 
well as strengthening state institutions. These initiatives expand the base of knowledge on 
security issues and are a positive step to building a more robust democratic oversight of 
the military. 
A second positive step was achieved in October 2015 with the Salvadoran 
legislature passing an unprecedented Security Tax to expand funding for El Salvador 
Seguro. Overcoming a heated public debate, legislators were able to pass a 5% tax on 
wealthy individuals and businesses, as well as cell phone and Internet plans.125 The 
willingness and ability to engage in this new act is a very positive step to civilian 
politicians seriously engaging in their role of confronting the security situation and 
generating a new source of funding to aid El Salvador’s police and military. 
A further impediment of oversight exists, however, with the continuation of the 
Amnesty Law of 1993, granting impunity for human rights abuses during the civil war. 
Unlike with other military human rights abuses across Latin America—and in stark 
contrast to the other two case studies presented in this thesis—many of the victims of the 
civil war in El Salvador were poor, rural campesinos, lacking the “clout or media access 
to protest” and push the government for justice.126 Atrocities in El Salvador were also at 
a higher magnitude and more brazen than in other Latin American cases. With over 
70,000 killed and thousands more tortured, raped, injured, and displaced, El Salvador still 
has deep wounds. Mauricio Funes was the first Salvadoran president to formally 
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apologize on behalf of the government on the twentieth anniversary of the peace accords 
for a particularly brutal massacre.127 He also pledged further investigation into abuses 
and a program of reparations for victims.128 In his inaugural address, President Sánchez 
Cerén pledged to continue support for civil war victims but there has been no concerted 
attempt to repeal the amnesty law through executive or judicial action. 
In terms of democratic oversight of the military, the executive branch lacks a 
politically appointed civilian minister of defense. The legislature, on the other hand, has 
very recently increased its role in oversight with its passage of the 2015 Security Tax. 
The military has still not been held accountable, however, for widespread abuse during 
the bloody civil war. Successive FMLN presidencies have taken very modest measures to 
revamp democratic oversight of the military. If compared to civil–military relations 
during and before the civil war, civilian-led democracy has been improved and there have 
been no direct challenges to civilian leadership; however, compared the two other 
countries studied in this thesis, there is still much reform required to bring positive 
democratic oversight of the military to El Salvador. 
3. Military Effectiveness under Democracy 
The Salvadoran armed forces face the overwhelming mission of stabilizing a 
country ravaged by violence. While not alone in the fight, they are increasingly called on 
to assist the National Civil Police. The two main Salvadoran maras (or street gangs) are 
Mara Salvatrucha and Calle Dieciocho; each has roots in the United States and for a 
number of reasons have become stronger and more violent in the last decade.129 The 
maras operate in a transnational network, at times working with Mexican and Colombian 
cartels, and participate in drug and human trafficking, extortion, kidnappings, and 
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contract killings (sicariatos).130 Considering the current security environment, the limited 
resources at the state’s disposal, and the high public trust in the armed forces, it is not 
surprising that the armed forces are so actively engaged in confronting the maras and 
their narco-trafficking cartel allies. 
In addition to their most prominent role of domestic security, the Salvadoran 
military has also engaged in multinational coalitions to include the U.S.-led coalitions in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. While the total troop contribution was limited, El Salvador was an 
early troop-supplier to the coalition in Iraq (sending about 380 troops between 2003 and 
2009) as well as supplying a smaller contingent of advisors and trainers to Afghanistan 
from 2011 to 2014. The presence of Latin American armed forces in either of these 
campaigns is unique and portrays the willingness of the Salvadoran government to 
support U.S. foreign policy. The United States, as a result, provides considerable aid to El 
Salvador in the form of over $20 million in annual bilateral aid, two five-year 
development assistance grants worth a total of $738 million, and selection of El Salvador 
as the only Latin American nation to the Partnership for Growth Initiative to strengthen 
trade and investment ties between the two countries.131 
El Salvador is also a troop contributor to UN Peacekeeping Operations. In 2014, 
the Salvadoran military had 87 troops deployed to the UNPKOs in Haiti and Lebanon.132 
While the participation rates are low, support for UNPKOs and coalitions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have provided a level of prestige to the small Central American nation’s 
military, while simultaneously staying engaged in domestic security operations.  
With a respected force and one that is actively and visibly engaged domestically, 
it is unexpected, then, that the country’s defense budget is only 0.62% of the Gross 
Domestic Product.133 Surprisingly, the election of FMLN presidents in 2009 and 2014 
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saw moderate increases in terms of overall defense spending and as a percent of GDP; 
however, El Salvador is still well below the defense spending regional average, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.  
Figure 3.  El Salvador’s Defense Budget 
  
Adapted from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (The Military Balance) 
There are two likely explanations for this low level of defense spending by the 
Salvadoran government. First, the state has low tax rates and a low capacity to collect tax 
revenue from its population. State institutions are lacking, as previously mentioned, due 
to the high levels of corruption and the lingering effects of civil war. The military is 
underfunded much like other state institutions, despite being held in relatively high 
esteem by the population. As noted in the previous section, the 2015 Security Tax is a 
very positive step to supply increased resources to the comprehensive Sánchez Cerén 
initiative, El Salvador Seguro; its implementation should be closely monitored to ensure 
the new tax is not evaded or misappropriated.  
Second, security and defense are systemically underfunded because those that can 



















































security. The PNC is a force of roughly 22,000 police; in 2013, there were over 28,000 
registered private security guards.134 This phenomenon is a break-down in government-
led citizen security and results in a country of two worlds. One is a world in which 
security can be guaranteed through private funding; another is a world surrounded by the 
battle between vicious maras with underpaid and perhaps corrupt security forces. The 
current security situation exacerbates longstanding issues of poverty and inequality in El 
Salvador, something that will almost certainly need significant international assistance to 
overcome. 
While the Salvadoran military has been lauded for its participation in operations 
abroad and—at least to date—has been well-received by much of the population for its 
support of the PNC, the civilian government has not dedicated sufficient resources to 
allow the military and civilian forces to effectively counter a very robust network of 
nefarious street gangs and well-funded narco-trafficking cartels. In the short-term, 
continued and increased international assistance is needed to turn the tide of insecurity in 
El Salvador. In the long-term, there must be a diminishing of the norm among the upper 
segments of society that security can be privately purchased and, instead, the government 
must gain the capacity to effectively enforce a rule of law in El Salvador. 
D. THE SÁNCHEZ CERÉN LEGACY 
Having been elected as President of El Salvador in 2014, Salvador Sánchez Cerén 
has not been the commander-in-chief long enough to evaluate his full legacy on civil–
military relations. Some trends can be analyzed, however. The first one is troubling.  
Although Sánchez Cerén brokered a new plan through an inclusive dialogue on 
citizen security—one that aims to tackle root causes and the systemic issues of El 
Salvador—a more recent initiative has declared the maras “terrorist organizations.”135 
The shift in approach is not only in nomenclature: minimum prison sentences have been 
increased and affiliation with a mara becomes not only a criminal offense but a charge of 
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terrorism. Considerable pressure has been placed on the Sánchez Cerén administration 
following the break-down of a gang truce under his predecessor’s administration. The 
truce, mediated between gang leaders by a senior Funes minister and a Catholic bishop in 
2012, had immediate effects on reducing gang violence; however, critics also point out 
that it legitimized the gangs, giving them more clout and strength.136 The truce was short-
lived and is now highly unpopular. Violence has jumped back up and Sánchez Cerén now 
declares that “we will not engage in dialogue with criminals.”137 The chosen response to 
a recent surge in gang violence has been to declare Mara Salvatrucha and Calle 
Dieciocho as terrorist organizations. This new, hardline approach will put strains on a 
military that is increasingly called on to engage in domestic security operations as well 
taking attention away from the long-term approaches to reducing gang violence.138 
A second trend under President Sánchez Cerén has been a balancing act between 
advancing the leftist causes of his FMLN while also appealing to international donors. As 
a deputy and as vice president, Sánchez Cerén championed educational programs to 
increase literacy across the country. In this sense, as a politician and now as president, 
Sánchez Cerén has placed higher emphasis on causes that drove him to teaching and less 
so to the causes that drove him to become a guerrilla commander. Reaching out to leftist 
governments in the region, Sánchez Cerén has received backing from ALBA to put 
computers in rural classrooms and from Cuba to bring medical workers to impoverished 
communities.139 Meanwhile, Sánchez Cerén maintains positive ties with the United 
States and international organizations such as the World Bank. With so much of his 
country in need of reform, development, and investment, Sánchez Cerén has placed his 
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political priorities on reducing poverty and raising investment and economic growth. The 
institutions of positive civil–military relations remain either largely absent or unchanged. 
Examining the early trends of the presidency of ex-insurgent Salvador Sánchez 
Cerén, and considering the array of challenges facing El Salvador, it appears that matters 
of security and defense will continue to be a highly autonomous arena managed by the 
Civilian National Police and the Salvadoran armed forces. It is seemingly paradoxical 
that President Sánchez Cerén can make an inclusive call on civil society to develop a plan 
addressing citizen security and then declare all the youth entangled in the vicious world 




Unlike many of its South American neighbors, relatively little has been written on 
the subject of civil–military relations in Uruguay. Following a pacted transition to 
democracy in 1984, the military remained highly influential in Uruguay under the 
ensuing conservative governments. Not until the 2005 election of the Frente Amplio 
candidate, President Tabaré Vázquez, did the military see its first true test of contestation 
with elected officials. Uruguayan civil society’s deep-rooted appreciation of democracy 
and its general satisfaction in its government have provided a base for positive civil–
military relations. The first section gives a brief military history of Uruguay from 1973 to 
the present. The second section offers a succinct biography of ex-Tupamaro insurgent 
José “Pepe” Mujica. The third section analyzes contemporary civil–military relations in 
Uruguay. The chapter concludes with a portrayal of President Mujica as a pragmatic 
politician whose focus on the future of Uruguay trumped any past misgivings he may 
have had with his former captors, the Uruguayan armed forces. 
A. URUGUAYAN MILITARY HISTORY: 1973–PRESENT 
The narrative leading up to the military golpe de estado in Uruguay fits much of 
the regional theme across Latin America. In the context of the Cold War, political 
ideologies varied from traditionally conservative and pro-West parties to socialist and 
pro-Soviet communist parties. In Uruguay, the most radical sect of the Socialist Party 
spawned a movement called the Tupamaros. While strictly political in its outset, the 
group transformed into an armed guerilla movement in conflict with the government and 
armed forces of Uruguay. From the late 1960s to 1972, under increasingly repressive 
conditions, the Tupamaros engaged in robberies, kidnappings, and assassinations. 
Perhaps their most famous operation was the kidnaping of British Ambassador to 
Uruguay, Sir Geoffrey Jackson.140 Unlike other Leftist insurgencies in Latin America, 
the Tupamaros were nearly defeated by 1973; however, the standing mandate provided 
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by President Juan María Bordaberry to his armed forces was to restore public security 
and it afforded the military great power in relation to the democratic regime. 
In 1973, the Uruguayan military seized control of Congress and the country 
entered civilian-military authoritarian rule.141 President Bordaberry remained in office 
while the armed forces received wide authority to manage the country and restore 
political, social, and economic order. As characterized by a Uruguayan Navy officer, “the 
cleavage between the historical political parties and the [Leftist] Frente Amplio facilitated 
the polarization of Uruguayan society and brought discredit to the politicians. The 
process ended with the rise of a military dictatorship.”142 It was widely perceived within 
the military that it was the only organization with the capability to provide “the security 
required for the country to achieve progress and economic growth.”143 Under the ensuing 
twelve years of authoritarian rule, it is estimated that between 3000 and 4000 Uruguayans 
were imprisoned and several hundred were killed or “disappeared” both within Uruguay 
and abroad.144 Political parties were outlawed and the regime targeted most violently the 
members of the Communist Party and Tupamaros.  
Democracy was restored in Uruguay in 1984 following a pacted agreement 
between the military and emerging political leaders. Included in their transition from 
political power, as part of the Pacto del Club Naval, the Uruguayan military and other 
leaders under the authoritarian regime were granted punitive immunity of human rights 
abuses committed during the dictatorship.145 While initially passed by a newly restored 
Parliament, the law was taken to referendum twice and validated by popular consent of 
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the people.146 Conservative Presidents were elected in Uruguay until the first electoral 
victory of the Left in 2005 by Tabaré Vázquez of a coalition of Left-wing parties known 
as the Frente Amplio.  
B. “PEPE” THE REVOLUTIONARY 
In 2009, following the five-year term held by Tabaré Vázquez, the Frente Amplio 
nominated ex-Tupamaro insurgent José “Pepe” Mujica. The following paragraphs 
provide a background of Mujica during his time as a leader of the Tupamaros. 
Joining the group as a political dissident of the traditional political parties, the 
Blancos and the Colorados, José Mujica helped establish the socialist Tupamaro 
organization in the late 1960s. The Tupamaros were inspired by the Cuban Revolution 
and Mujica saw the organization shift from politics to violent acts. Mujica himself 
commanded operations to include a bank robbery where he allegedly shot a police 
officer.147 Having himself been shot as many as six times, Mujica was frequently 
involved in actions in and around Montevideo. Mujica’s most famous action as a 
Tupamaro came in a daring escape from prison of over one hundred insurgent captives. 
This and other actions brought great fame to Mujica’s Tupamaro past. 
After being captured a third time, José Mujica spent a total of fourteen years 
detained during the military dictatorship. He spent two years in solitary confinement 
where his only companions were “a tiny frog and rats with whom he shared crumbs of 
bread.”148 He went years without having anything to read and—despite not speaking in 
great detail of his captivity—admits that he learned that “one can always start again.”149 
Following the transition to democracy, political prisoners were released and Mujica 
worked with others to form the Movimiento de Participación Popular, which would join 
other parties of the Left to form the Frente Amplio.  
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With Mujica’s insurgent past as a leader of the Tupamaros as well has his 
fourteen years as a prisoner of the military dictatorship, contentious civil–military 
relations could have been predicted and expected. Upon his election, Mujica had not only 
a well-publicized past as an imprisoned guerrilla leader, but also as a keen and successful 
politician. Mujica was first elected to Uruguay’s lower house of Congress in 1994, then 
to the Senate in 1999, and was appointed as the Minister of Livestock, Agriculture, and 
Fisheries during the Vázquez Administration. His most recent political accomplishments, 
not his guerrilla past, gave him the reputation of a “pragmatist and consensus-builder.”150  
C. CONTEMPORARY CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN URUGUAY 
Positive civil–military relations in Uruguay can be largely credited to low levels 
of violence and a robust Ministry of Defense, especially by Latin American standards. 
With relatively mature democratic institutions, there is less of Pion-Berlin’s “Political 
Management” of the military than can be seen elsewhere in the region. Democracy is 
held in very high esteem by Uruguayans. Polling data shows Uruguay as a regional leader 
in preferring democracy as the most desirable form of government (70.9% of the 
population) and rejecting any return to authoritarian rule, even in dire circumstances.151 
The domestic climate in Uruguay can be considered unique in comparison to 
other Latin American countries. Uruguay has limited pressure to use its military for 
public security in comparison to neighboring Brazil and certainly countries such as 
Colombia, Mexico and most of the Central American nations. This lack of pressure stems 
from both the relatively low crime rates when compared to other countries in the region 
as well as a Uruguayan populace that is mildly content with the services provided by 
police and penal institutions. Latinobarómetro shows that, among Latin Americans, 
Uruguayans have very high trust in their police and judicial institutions.152  
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Leading up to the 2005 elections, the Frente Amplio had included in its campaign 
platform a call for investigation of human rights abuses and a reduction in budget and 
autonomy afforded to the armed forces.153 The transition from military-friendly parties to 
the Frente Amplio, especially considering its pronounced platform in conflict with 
military interests, is viewed as a civil–military relations milestone: “the armed forces 
orderly submitted to the ascent to government of its once internal enemy.”154 
The following sections apply the civil–military relations framework to Uruguay 
and assess the democratic incorporation of its military, the democratic oversight of its 
military, and the military effectiveness under Uruguayan democracy. 
1. Democratic Incorporation of the Military 
President Vázquez, the first Frente Amplio president, broke ground for major 
progress in institutionalizing and incorporating the armed forces into the Uruguayan 
democracy. Shortly after assuming office, Vázquez initiated a public debate on defense 
(Debate Nacional sobre la Defensa) with the goal of opening a dialogue among a diverse 
set of actors across society.155 This debate resulted in a new post of National Intelligence 
Coordinator as well as the National Defense Act of 2010 (Ley Marco de Defensa 
Nacional).156 Both the consolidation of intelligence operations under a new coordinator 
as well as the rewriting of national law reorganized and cemented the military under 
civilian control. The National Defense Act not only assigned traditional roles and 
missions to the military such as the defense of national sovereignty and strategic 
resources, but also allowed the military to engage in public works, education, and health 
missions as assigned by the President and Minister of Defense.157 One additional role 
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was codified under President Vázquez, which further incorporated the military into 
greater national priorities: the role of Uruguayan forces abroad in support of United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations.158 
With a small population and limited economic strength, Uruguay has employed 
varying methods to play a relevant role in regional and international relations. Formal 
involvement in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations began under the Lacalle 
Presidency (1990-95), as the civilian government sought a method to maintain military 
professionalism while also obtaining external funding to lessen the military burden on the 
national budget.159 Since joining the large community of nations supplying troops to the 
UN, Uruguay has been a leader in per capita participation. Since 2003, Uruguay has 
supplied between 1,800 and 2,600 peacekeepers, frequently in the top ten of overall 
contributors to UNPKOs.160 Furthermore, Uruguay has not limited its involvement to 
basic conscripts of infantry and military police, but has routinely supplied engineers, 
medics, communications technicians, and naval forces.161 
Building on the Uruguayan reputation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, the Frente 
Amplio formally included this mission in doctrine and linked the military’s mission 
abroad with more general foreign policy.162 The peacekeeping mission “emerged as a 
golden opportunity” for the armed forces when it was “returning to its barracks under 
conditions of domestic socio-political isolation.”163 While on the campaign trail, there 
were signals that both of the Frente Amplio presidents would downsize the Uruguayan 
military’s presence abroad; however, troop numbers remained above 1,800 throughout 
each President’s term with only a slight decrease under President Mujica.164 With 
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growing expertise and recognition as an exporter of peacekeepers, Uruguay continues to 
actively engage in these operations. Furthermore, to strengthen its case to become a non-
permanent member of the UN Security Council, Uruguay successfully highlighted its 
longstanding role in UNPKOs as a leading argument to hold the Latin American seat on 
this powerful global body from 2016 to 2017.165 
In addition to the deployment of UN peacekeepers, President Mujica found 
another way to pursue his goals in foreign policy. In an open letter to President Obama 
and his own countrymen, Mujica allowed for the transfer of six Guantanamo detainees to 
Uruguay. While calling on Uruguayans to receive the prisoners in solidarity, Mujica was 
also able to elevate the issue of Cuba’s hemispheric isolation and the humanitarian 
injustice of the Guantanamo detention center.166 This action brought international 
headlines, both because of the difficulty Obama had encountered in transferring those 
jailed at Guantanamo but also in the symbolic action of an ex-political prisoner receiving 
six detainees into the small South American nation. Mujica was able to further propagate 
the peaceful image of Uruguay abroad while also putting the long-standing frozen U.S.-
Cuba relations back in the media—relations that only months later began to thaw. 
The Uruguayan military has been incorporated into the broader government and 
has been used as a tool to pursue national goals. The greatest accomplishment of the 
democratic incorporation of the military was the National Defense Act. 
2. Democratic Oversight of the Military  
The Ministry of Defense in Uruguay was established in 1828, the same year that 
the Treaty of Montevideo was signed and neighbors Argentina and Brazil recognized 
Uruguay as an independent nation.167 The Minister has been a member of the military 
fifteen times and has been civilian twenty-four times; the current Minister of Defense is a 
                                                 
165 Gonzalez Guyer, “La Contribución de Uruguay.” 
166 Massimo De Ricco, “From Guantanamo to Montevideo and on to Havana,” Al-Jazeera, December 
17, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/12/from-guantanamo-montevideo-hav-
2014121715813982219.html. 
167 “Historia,” Uruguayan Ministry of Defense, accessed September 18, 2015, 
http://www.mdn.gub.uy/?q=historia 
 60
civilian, as is required by contemporary Uruguayan law.168 Furthermore, the Ministry has 
eight directorates with over 1,400 civilian employees and a military Joint Staff that is 
subordinate to the Minister of Defense and serves to advise the National Defense Council 
(Consejo de Defensa Nacional, or CODENA).169 The National Defense Act of 2010 laid 
out legislative duties that assigned congress the function of designating the size of the 
armed forces as well as declaring war. In addition, congress has the responsibilities of 
overseeing military education and development programs and approving military 
promotions.170  
With a large Ministry of Defense and considerable civilian staffing, Uruguay has 
invested significant resources to the oversight of its armed forces. One reason could be 
the simple fact that Uruguay is one of the wealthiest nations per capita in Latin America. 
Conversely, Uruguayans are likely keen to maintain civilian control of the armed forces, 
still cognizant of the civilian-military authoritarian rule in the 1970s and 1980s, and have 
built a strong institution to actively oversee the military. While the institutions of positive 
civil–military relations have been strengthened in recent years, there exists an open issue 
and debate related to the military’s past. 
While the Frente Amplio advertised its aim at bringing justice for human rights 
abuses, Uruguay has seen only moderate accountability carried out. A main sticking point 
in pursuing justice is the 1986 Expiry Law (Ley de Caducidad), which grants immunity 
to state officials who carried out political violence during the dictatorship. Under 
President Vázquez, the Expiry Law was reinterpreted to withhold protection from crimes 
committed before the coup of 1973, allowing for the trial of over six hundred members of 
the military, as well as actions taking place outside of Uruguay—unlocking charges 
against former President Bordaberry and de facto dictator General Alvarez.171 The 
success to bring justice for human rights abuses “clearly demonstrates that where the 
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executive has political will, progress in retributive justice can be made.”172 This political 
will seemed to be reduced after the Vázquez term in office with fewer charges carried out 
and no new attempt to rescind the Expiry Law by President Mujica. A major reason for 
this scaling back of justice was the 2009 failed popular referendum to repeal the Expiry 
Law, the same year President Mujica was elected. Rather than continue the aggressive 
push of his predecessor, Mujica heeded the message from Uruguayan society and focused 
his political will elsewhere. 
With the continuation of the Expiry Law a level of tension lingers in what some 
Uruguayan politicians believe is the correct level of democratic oversight and 
accountability. Within the Frente Amplio there is debate as to how aggressively the repeal 
of the Expiry Law should be pursued. Despite this open issue, Uruguay has spent 
considerable resources and set up strong institutions to provide a level of oversight that is 
uncommon in the region. 
3. Military Effectiveness under Democracy 
As previously mentioned, Uruguay’s military is only minimally used in providing 
public security. While the Uruguayan armed forces are not constitutionally prohibited 
from engaging in domestic security activities, such as in neighboring Argentina, the low 
level of insecurity coupled with functioning police and courts allow the military to refrain 
from being used in public security missions. Even under growing threats of narco-
trafficking, there has not been a large counter-drug role for the armed forces; instead, the 
National Police remains at the forefront of such domestic missions with talks of 
transferring soldiers with peacekeeping experience under the command of the National 
Police.173 There are, however, other domestic missions assigned to Uruguay’s military. 
The Uruguayan military is deployed domestically in many unconventional 
missions—and is authorized to do so under law. In 2013, the military was deployed to 
support the Ministries of Public Health and Social Development to conduct small public 
works projects and assist with logistics of medical operations for poor and remote parts of 
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the country.174 As a part of a broader national environmental protection program, the 
navy has an outreach project to educate and familiarize youth with the sea.175 The 
military has also assisted in cases of natural disaster and emergency, using its equipment 
and capabilities in times of increased need. Uruguay has recovered trust in its armed 
forces, maintained high public security, and unconventionally used its military in times of 
peace; however, there should be mild concern that using the military in place of other 
state actors to conduct the relevant domestic missions could prevent adequate 
institutional capacity from developing in the Ministries of Public Health and Social 
Development.  
Uruguay spends slightly less than the regional average on defense—the Latin 
American average in 2014 was 1.28% of GDP—but is also more limited in its use of the 
military.176 Uruguay does not have the need to fund a military combatting insurgency or 
widespread crime. Likewise, as a leading UN Peacekeeping Operations contributor, 
Uruguay receives UN compensation that offsets some expenses. In the years under the 
Frente Amplio, the Uruguayan defense budget has seen a decrease when analyzed in 
terms of percentage of GDP; however, the total expenditure has actually increased 
considerably (see Figure 4). Most of the increase took place under President Vázquez and 
coincided with very prosperous years for Uruguay. The national economy continued to 
grow under President Mujica while defense spending started to level off, hence the 
decrease in the defense budget as a percent of GDP from 2010 to 2014. Just as Mujica 
continued much of the work by his predecessor in incorporating the defense institutions 
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Figure 4.  Uruguay’s Defense Budget 
 
Adapted from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (The Military Balance) 
The Uruguayan military has been used to great success internationally in support 
of UN Peacekeeping Operations and domestically in small, unconventional missions. The 
military is not used heavily for public security, yet receives ample resources to carry out 
its assigned missions. There is no sign of military “mission creep” into unwanted 
domains nor severe cuts to spending, largely due to the institutionalized and positive 
relationship between the military and its civilian leaders. 
D. THE MUJICA LEGACY 
As already the inheritor of major, positive civil–military reforms, President 
Mujica received a tempting idea from a fellow Latin American leader. Costa Rican 
President Oscar Arias publicly called on Mujica to abolish the Uruguayan military. Arias 
wrote to “Pepe the Revolutionary” explaining that “armies are the enemies of 
development, the enemies of peace, the enemies of freedom, and the enemies of joy.”177 
                                                 



















































Arias, the president of the first nation in the world to abolish its military, recalled 
Mujica’s past when calling on his disbanding of the military: “You who suffered under 
the yoke of oppression, now have the opportunity to rid forever from that yoke the 
children of tomorrow.”178  
President Mujica, no longer the revolutionary, cited the need of a military to 
continue the fight against poverty; he responded with measured and practical words: “my 
personal opinion does not matter [because] when you are president, you do not do what 
you want to do, you do just what you can.”179 Mujica’s election coincided with a 
renewed call from the Uruguayan people to let stand the Expiry Law, granting protections 
to human rights violators. As a pragmatic politician, Mujica decided to not destabilize 
civil–military relations with a new repeal attempt of the Expiry Law—and he was 
certainly not going to try to disband the armed forces. 
José Mujica retained many of the ideals of an inspired revolutionary upon 
becoming President of Uruguay. He has been referred to by many publications and 
newspapers as the “humblest” national leader—a title he earned by donating much of his 
presidential salary, driving an old Volkswagen Beetle, and living at home in very modest 
conditions instead of the presidential palace. His image has brought attention to his small 
nation, but his actions have been a deliberate mix of savvy international gestures and 
measured domestic maneuvers. As the recipient of a stable democracy and positive civil–
military relations, Mujica handed the Presidency back to his predecessor, Tabaré 
Vázquez. Increasing exposure in the international community often requires news-worthy 
actions and notable characters—especially for a small nation like Uruguay. Maintaining 
positive civil–military relations, however, requires pragmatic political action. President 
Mujica and the Frente Amplio have worked to institutionalize their relationship with the 
military while also reinforcing and codifying the Uruguayan military’s role as an 
international peacekeeper. Civil–military relations have been improved and lessons can 
be learned from José Mujica and his party’s methods over the last ten years. 




V. TRENDS AND RESULTS 
Building on the research conducted in this comparative analysis of civil–military 
relations in Brazil, El Salvador, and Uruguay—as well as drawing on observations from 
across Latin America—three trends are presented in this chapter. The trends bring to light 
successful approaches for countries working on strengthening civil–military relations 
while also exposing common roadblocks to this process across the region. Following the 
trends, the results of the analysis of the three case studies are displayed according to the 
framework described in Chapter I and applied in Chapters II, III, and IV. Finally, this 
chapter closes the thesis with a conclusion. 
A. TRENDS 
Three trends are presented. The first, gleaned from Douglass North’s concept of 
the “increasing returns” of institutions, highlights the roles of institutions in civil–military 
relations in Latin America. The second, in a nod to scholars of culture such as Clifford 
Geertz and Samuel Huntington, looks beyond institutional legacies of civil–military 
relations to see what cultural progress has been made. The third trend, underscoring one 
of the five requisite arenas to consolidated democracies according to Juan Linz and 
Alfred Stepan, shows both promising and troubling shifts in attitude among civil societies 
in Latin American nations. 
1. Institutional Return on Investment  
In his book Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Douglass North asserted that “the interdependent web of an institutional matrix produces 
massive increasing returns.”180 North pitches the value in undertaking the “large initial 
setup costs” that are associated with institutions, pointing to the “increasing returns” they 
provide over time. While his assessment is focused on economics, the parallel is 
appropriate as a trend learned in this analysis of civil–military relations. 
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The lesson learned on the role of institutions here is twofold. First, placing a 
civilian in charge of a Ministry of Defense is insufficient to claim civilian oversight of 
the military. The individual must have the political clout to command respect within the 
democratic system and must be accompanied by a staff capable of overseeing the myriad 
points of engagement between civilian and military leaders. That is, there must be a true 
political investment made to a Ministry of Defense. This is particularly important as 
militaries engage in more complex roles and missions that inherently require increased 
cooperation and coordination between militaries and their governments.  
Second, there are high costs associated with building the aforementioned 
institutions. Unsurprisingly, the countries with higher levels of development have 
exhausted more resources on developing strong institutions. This point is not to say that 
the investment is not worthwhile or insurmountable.  
There is a first, obvious benefit to investing in strong institutions of civil–military 
relations: to insure civilian control of the military and avoid a military coup d’état. 
Additionally, the persistence of positive civil–military relations in all cases analyzed 
despite the election of former adversaries of the military can be largely attributed to the 
“institutionalization” of civil–military relations in all three countries. While it was 
entirely plausible that the election of an ex-insurgent to any of the three presidencies 
could have resulted in a negative swing of the relationship with the military—perhaps all 
the way to the “vindictive” case of civil–military relations in Argentina or the 
“politicization” in the Bolivarian cases of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia181—the 
institutionalization of civil–military relations served, to some degree, as a buffer against 
any personal vendetta of an ex-insurgent president and his or her relationship with the 
armed forces.  
A third benefit to mature institutions is that with increased civilian oversight 
through various institutions, funds allocated to defense can be managed more efficiently. 
With a more efficient appropriation of defense funding, and aligning defense initiatives 
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with broader national goals, efficiencies brought on by defense institutions can bring 
increasing advantages over time. 
The value of strong institutions is a key point of intervention for international 
donors. With clear shortcomings in its institutional capacity, the United States should 
consider increased concentration of security assistance to El Salvador—and other 
countries of similar deficiencies like Guatemala and Honduras—toward institutional 
strengthening. With patience, the returns on investment in institutions will surely be 
realized. 
2. Culture Matters 
Shifting away from the oft-studied field of institutions, there is a need for 
increased study of the cultural dynamics of civil–military relations. In 1973, Clifford 
Geertz pointed to culture as a way to study the significance or meaning associated to an 
institution where traditional and empirical study fell short.182 More recently, Samuel 
Huntington examined how culture “affects the extent to which and the ways in which 
societies achieve or fail to achieve progress in economic development and political 
democratization.”183 Culture matters in the maturation of democracy, and this assertion is 
certainly valid in the domain of civil–military relations. 
Perhaps the greatest effect on the relationship between a democratically elected 
ex-insurgent president and the nation’s military is the full closure it can provide to a past 
era of repression. While all three cases analyzed have continued their respective amnesty 
laws for past human-rights abuses, what remains unresolved in the legal and judicial 
systems has experienced great strides forward from a cultural perspective. This is best 
portrayed in the Brazilian case. 
As described in the Chapter II, Dilma Rousseff took two actions to bring in a new 
age of civil–military relations in Brazil. While restricted from prosecuting, her Truth 
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Commission was a public uncovering of many brutal acts committed by the Brazilian 
military that was delivered with extra emphasis from a woman who had personally 
suffered torture. She also became the commander-in-chief of a military, some officers of 
which were still accustomed to speaking with bravado of its “saving of the nation” 
through its coup d’état in 1964. While institutional reforms to civil–military relations 
were largely accomplished by her two predecessors, by banning the commemorations and 
celebrations of the military coup Rousseff set a new cultural tone to the relationship 
between the civilian government and its subordinate military. 
A president who personally suffered under authoritarian rule is in a unique 
position to lead a nation and a military through this cultural shift. The cases of Brazil and 
Uruguay feature an ex-insurgent who endured tremendous suffering. While not an 
insurgent herself, President Michelle Bachelet of Chile can be categorized in a similar 
manner due to her imprisonment, interrogation, and exile under the brutal dictatorship of 
Augusto Pinochet. It is perhaps too far a stretch to equate Dilma Rousseff, José Mujica, 
or Michelle Bachelet as a Latin American Nelson Mandela; however, the comparison is 
valuable in assessing a positive shift in civil–military relations that allowed a nation to 
celebrate the achievement of electing a public figure who, like so much of the nation, had 
suffered under authoritarian repression and set a new tone for civilian supremacy over the 
military. In this regard, similar to the tremendous leadership exhibited by Nelson 
Mandela as he led South Africa through the dismembering of apartheid, the leadership of 
the presidents of Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile should be recognized for the cultural gains 
achieved toward positive civil–military relations. 
3. The Role of Civil Society 
To the credit of all three of the case studies in this thesis, political leaders have 
recently undertaken the task of expanding the dialogue on security and defense to a broad 
cross-section of their civil societies. In their conditions for a consolidated democracy, 
Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan point to five “interconnected and mutually reinforcing” 
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arenas that must exist.184 The first, civil society, they describe as “self-organizing groups, 
movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, [that] attempt to 
articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests.”185 It is 
this arena that has seen the most recent and most significant advances among all three 
countries studied. 
In Brazil, under President Cardoso, the process of initiating a public dialogue on 
defense was led by Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim with the crafting of a National 
Defense Strategy in 2008. In El Salvador, under President Sánchez Cerén, a dialogue was 
launched among a wide spectrum of society to craft the plan El Salvador Seguro. In 
Uruguay, President Vázquez initiated a public debate resulting in the National Defense 
Act of 2010.  
In some cases across the region, this civil engagement is also taking place 
alongside the growth of a civilian population that is increasingly interested and educated 
in security and defense affairs. As mentioned in the first trend on institutional 
development, there is a need for a larger pool of civilians with experience and education 
in defense to further staff most ministries of defense across the region. Likewise, there 
are few legislators and legislative staffs with active oversight of their militaries. With a 
public more engaged in security and defense issues, politicians are more incentivized to 
make these issues a part of their political platforms. That is, with a more engaged civil 
society there can be more voluntad política, or political will. Additionally, a cadre of aids 
and advisors may even develop to assist lawmakers in their roles of overseeing military 
budgets. This development seems to be on the cusp of reality in Brazil. 
There is a counter-trend, however, that is unsettling in the region. According to 
Latinobarómetro, Latin Americans as a whole are becoming more dissatisfied with 
democracy as their preferred form of government. According to 2015 surveying, “Latin 
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Americans are disenchanted with politics and highly distrust their political 
institutions…only 31 percent of those surveyed felt represented by their government.”186 
To put this negative trend of the popularity of democracy alongside the positive 
trend of the trust in the military could raise some flags for more traditional scholars of 
civil–military relations focused exclusively on civilian control. It would be too simplistic 
a calculation, however, to draw this conclusion. As seen in this thesis and presented in 
full in the Appendix, the military is routinely trusted above law enforcement, penal, and 
judicial institutions. Likewise, corruption and poor economic performance are leading 
reasons for public displeasure and rather than the emergence of insurgencies across the 
region the present phenomenon is of peaceful protest, demonstrations, and a call for 
investigation of corruption using non-military mechanisms. Putting the current citizen 
unrest in perspective, “this decade is marked by the ‘hyper-participation’ of citizens”187 
who are demanding greater accountability of elected officials and not of a return to 
military rule. 
B. RESULTS 
The framework presented in Chapter I was the foundation of each chapter’s 
analysis of contemporary civil–military relations. Each pillar of the framework is 
summarized here with the grade, or degree, of positive civil–military relations assessed to 
each country. The framework is then displayed at the end of the section in Table 3 to 
evaluate each country’s overall progress toward positive civil–military relations. 
1. Democratic Incorporation of the Military 
The new pillar to the framework of civil–military relations, democratic 
incorporation of the military, has a wide disparity between the two South American 
nations studied and the Central American nation. In democratic Brazil, significant 
progress has been made to develop not only a National Defense Policy (1996), by the 
federal government, but a National Defense Strategy (2012), published by the civilian-led 
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Ministry of Defense. Similarly, Uruguay published a National Defense Strategy in 2010. 
The strategies were milestones in clarifying the roles and missions of each country’s 
military and aligning military strategy with broader national goals and interests. This can 
be seen in both countries’ strategic participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations as well 
as both countries expanding state services to remote parts of the country. This is 
especially true in President Rousseff’s employment of the Brazilian military in support of 
domestic development. Democratic incorporation of the Brazilian and Uruguayan 
militaries are assessed as High. 
Democratic incorporation in El Salvador, on the other hand, faces its single 
greatest obstacle to positive civil–military relations of clearly defining the military’s role 
in the fight against the maras. There is a persistent concern that the 1992 Peace Accords 
are not being adhered to and, despite an allowance due to an “emergency” security 
situation, there is no evidence of a diminishing of the military’s role in supporting the 
National Civil Police. There is a history and culture of high military autonomy that must 
be overcome; one positive note is President Sánchez Cerén’s initiative to open a national 
dialogue on citizen security. El Salvador is assessed as Medium-Low. 
In drawing a contrast between the highly consolidated democracies of the 
Southern Cone of South America and El Salvador, the role of a mature civil-society 
appears to be a leading driver to having a military that is democratically incorporated. 
The iterative process of developing national and defense strategies in Brazil and Uruguay 
required a dialogue among politicians and an engaged civil society. This observation, 
therefore, provides some hope to a less mature Salvadoran democracy in its more recent 
efforts in engaging in this dialogue to not only tackle its security issues but also 
democratically incorporate its military. 
2. Democratic Oversight of the Military 
A similar pattern is observed with respect to the democratic oversight of the 
military: the South American nations have more mature and institutionalized civil–
military relations while El Salvador’s institutions are still lacking. Brazil and Uruguay 
have a civilian-led Ministry of Defense. While Brazil’s was only established in 1999, 
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Uruguay has a longstanding Ministry of Defense that is not only led by a civilian minister 
but also has a robust staff of civilian cadre. Brazil has experienced a growing level of 
expertise among civil society—especially in academia and advisory think-tanks—but 
there has not been an established career track for civilians to work within the Ministry of 
Defense, something that should be addressed. 
Both countries of the Southern Cone have been unable—or unwilling—to repeal 
amnesty laws that continue to provide impunity for human rights abuses during their 
respective authoritarian regimes. While Uruguay has had some success prosecuting a 
handful of perpetrators, the population has twice voted down by referendum a repeal of 
amnesty, a vote that President Mujica respected. In Brazil, President Lula da Silva was 
unable to launch a truth commission but then saw his successor, President Rousseff 
launch and then conclude a truth commission that allowed Brazil to grieve its past. The 
truth commission did not permit crimes to be prosecuted, however, and in both countries 
this issue is still outstanding. Both Brazil and Uruguay are assessed as Medium-High for 
their democratic oversight of their militaries. 
Democratic oversight in El Salvador requires a reform of its Ministry of Defense 
to place more civilian leaders in the chain-of-command between the president and 
military generals. Furthermore, there is limited legislative oversight of the military and 
successive governments have done next-to-nothing to address or atone for egregious 
human rights abuses by the government during the civil war. Had this assessment been 
made only months ago—in the summer of 2015—the grade would have been a definitive 
“Low”; however, a recent law passed by the legislature to impose a security tax to fund 
President Sánchez Cerén’s plan, El Salvador Seguro, is a very positive first step. Its 
implementation must be closely monitored to ensure taxes are collected and that 
corruption is avoided. At the moment, El Salvador’s democratic oversight is assessed as 
Medium-Low. 
While a weaker civil society seemed to be a leading driver to weaker democratic 
incorporation of the Salvadoran military, the leading impediment to its democratic 
oversight is a combination of its civil society and its underdevelopment. As was noted in 
the case of Uruguay, funding and staffing a Ministry of Defense is an expensive endeavor 
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for a state. Uruguay is one of the few Latin American nations to be deemed a “High 
Income Level” country by the World Bank. It is a state that has a rich population with 
high tax revenues and high state capacity across all of its institutions, especially relative 
to El Salvador. It is not surprising, then, that El Salvador—an underdeveloped and poor 
country—has not developed the institutions of positive civil–military relations that are 
present in Brazil or Uruguay. 
3. Military Effectiveness under Democracy 
In terms of military effectiveness under democracy, it would be easy to surmise 
that a higher defense budget yields a more effective military, or, put another way, that a 
country “gets what it pays for.” The comparative analysis of this thesis has found that 
phrase to be only partially true. Brazil, the Latin American nation with the largest defense 
budget, uses its military in a number of capacities and, according to the Brazilian Army 
Commander, is a force that operates on “two poles.” Similar to the nation as a whole, the 
Brazilian army seems to be torn between desires of becoming a force capable of power 
projection abroad and one whose global aspirations are routinely interrupted due to its 
role as a pacifying force at home. In order to achieve its desired role as a regional and 
global leader, and in order for Brazil’s democratic government to “get what it pays for,” 
there must be a reduction in the Brazilian military’s use as a “handyman” for the various 
shortcomings of state capacity domestically. Brazil’s military effectiveness under 
democracy is assessed as Medium. 
In neighboring Uruguay, the armed forces are a much smaller and leaner force 
with a more narrow set of roles and missions. Uruguay pays significantly less than Brazil 
for its military but smartly employs them as a capable and respected peacekeeping force 
abroad as well as sparingly in support of other state agencies providing public works and 
environmental projects. Additionally, Uruguay does not dispatch its military in support of 
law enforcement agencies; its military effectiveness under democracy is assessed as 
High. 
Military effectiveness is a relative bright spot of civil–military relations in El 
Salvador due to a military that has been widely engaged in international operations while 
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developing a very high level of public trust. There is the concern, however, of severe 
underfunding—especially considering the array of missions its civilian leaders demand. 
Furthermore, there is a phenomenon of the elite in El Salvador taking it upon themselves 
to hire private security, highlighting the lack of confidence in the state—especially the 
National Civil Police—in providing public security. In the case of the Salvadoran 
military, it could be said the state actually gets more than it pays for. El Salvador’s 
military effectiveness under democracy is assessed as Medium. 
Figure 5 illustrates the wide differences in defense spending among the three 
countries, shown as a percent of the Gross Domestic Product. 
Figure 5.  Defense Budgets as Percent GDP 
 
Adapted from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (The Military Balance)  
In terms of military effectiveness, there appears to be a dual-gain in military 
participation in operations abroad. All three countries have sent troops in support of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations. Furthermore, El Salvador sent members of its armed forces to 
join the U.S.-led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Engaging in international operations 
is a source of pride for these Latin American nations and can elevate its foreign policy 
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agendas as well as bring in additional funding to equip and modernize its forces. 
Additionally, especially for nations whose militaries were feared or despised twenty or 
thirty years ago, engaging in operations abroad can restore dignity and respect to the 
military profession as well as regain public trust. This is most notable in post-civil war El 
Salvador and is a valuable lesson for other nations and their militaries. 
4. Summary of Results 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the comparative analysis, resulting in Uruguay 
setting an example for the achievement of positive civil–military relations: 
Table 3.   Summary of Results 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
To conclude this comparative analysis it is worth a brief step back in time. The 
year 1980 can seem a lifetime ago—in fact, it is before the birth year of the author of this 
thesis—but it was also a pivotal year in the lives of the three ex-insurgent presidents 
analyzed in this thesis. Consider… 
In 1980, Dilma Rousseff had been released from three years imprisonment where 
she was brutally tortured and finally released back into Brazilian society. She had been 
expelled from her role as an undergraduate student but, under the opening—or 
abertura—of civil society by the military government she returned to study economics 
and was nearing completion of her degree. Things were getting better in Brazil but it 












Brazil  High Medium-High Medium Medium-High 
El Salvador  Medium-Low Medium-Low Medium Medium-Low 
Uruguay High  Medium-High High High 
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Meanwhile, in El Salvador, Salvador Sánchez Cerén was a rising leader of the 
recently founded Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front. The 12-year civil war had 
just begun with a horribly bloody year. Over 11,000 Salvadorans were killed in 1980 
alone, and peace would not be established for eleven more long years. 
Finally, the year 1980 in Uruguay would go perhaps unnoticed for José Mujica. 
After being captured his third time, Mujica was just over half-way through his total of 
thirteen years of imprisonment—including some in solitary confinement—under the 
civilian-military regime that would not come to close until 1985, the year Mujica was 
released. 
Despite the dim prospects for democracy in 1980, Brazil, El Salvador, and 
Uruguay did transition away from violence and authoritarianism. Not only have all three 
held dozens of peaceful elections without relapse to military rule, all three have had 
political power shift between opposing parties and even had formerly illegal and 
insurgent politicians run for and win political office. While it may have seemed 
impossible thirty-five years ago, former insurgents have become presidents through 
democratic elections in each country.  
The underlying message of this study can be summarized as a hopeful one of 
political progress and reconciliation. The underlying message is that, through carefully 
constructed institutions of democracy—as well as through political participation and 
compromise—ideological differences that drove adversaries to arms have subsided over 
time. Nations with ongoing insurgencies in the region can take note of lessons learned in 
all three cases analyzed in this thesis to craft an environment for positive civil–military 
relations—an environment with strong institutions, inspired leadership, and civil 
discourse. The process is not easy or fast, but well worth the effort. 
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APPENDIX: LATINOBARÓMETRO POLLING DATA 
Latinobarómetro-
2013 Brazil El Salvador Uruguay LATAM Avg 
La democracia es 
preferible a cualquier otra 
forma de gobierno 48.5 48.7 70.9 56.2 
          
Confianza en poder 
judicial-mucha/algo 41.2 23.8 48.7 29.5 
          
Confianza en policía-
mucha/algo 43.8 38.8 51.1 40.7 
          
Confianza en fuerzas 
armadas-mucha/algo 67 70.4 54 49.6 
Confianza en fuerzas 
armadas-poca/ninguna 30.3 38 40.9 38.3 
          
Las fuerzas armadas 
deberían gobernar--muy 
en desacuerdo 49.3 16.5 42.2 27.9 
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